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ABSTRACT 
Essays on Status Perceptions within the Workplace 
By  
Juanita Forrester 
December, 2017 
 
Committee Chair: Nikos Dimotakis 
Academic Unit: Department of Managerial Sciences 
 
Status, or a person’s ranking within a hierarchy, is a core organizing principle for social 
dynamics within the workplace. Those with high status receive a broad range of social, material, 
and psychological privileges by virtue of their social standing. For example, status is linked to 
high levels of social attention, including interest and respect from others, material rewards in the 
form salary and bonuses, and psychological benefits including autonomy, control, and well-being 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). For these reasons, the question of why and how status is ascribed 
and the behaviors that follow these arrangements are of critical importance to people and groups 
within organizations.   
This work focuses on exploring the perceptual nature of status. Across three essays, I 
explore where status perceptions come from and the processes that influence whether status 
assignments create or disrupt social harmony. First, I present a theoretical discussion of the 
possible sources and outcomes of status disagreement. Next, I explain how individual-level 
differences in ideology may lead to divergent patterns in the way that people strive for status, 
assign status to others, and make status-based inferences. Finally, I examine how situational 
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factors influence how well actors in high and low status roles work with others to achieve 
collaborative or competitive goals. Below, I provide a more specific overview of each of these 
three essays.  
The first essay focuses specifically on the phenomenon of status disagreement (Kilduff et 
al., 2016), or instances when people disagree about who belongs at the top and bottom of a status 
hierarchy. While we have reason to believe that status disagreement is a common real-world 
occurrence, our understanding of the origins of this concept and its consequences is only 
beginning to emerge. This work makes two main contributions to existing knowledge. First, this 
essay expands our consideration of the sources of status disagreement by illustrating the potential 
for variation within three overlapping conceptual dimensions: personal motives, information, 
ideals. Second, this work broadens the range of possible consequences that might emerge from 
status disagreement, outlining the potential for both group-level and individual-level outcomes.  
The second essay focuses on ideology as an individual-level difference that leads to 
variation in how people strive to attain status, ascribe status to others, and make inferences about 
the value of others’ contributions. I propose that those who are high on social dominance 
orientation, or hierarchy-enhancing beliefs that support hierarchy and inequality, are more likely 
to value behaviors that signal competence. In contrast, those who are low on social dominance 
orientation, or hierarchy-attenuating beliefs that support equality and the distribution of 
opportunity, are more likely to value behaviors that signals warmth. These processes have 
important implications for foundational workplace practices, including recruitment, selection and 
performance appraisals.  
In the third essay, I explore how status may derive its meaning from situational 
characteristics that encourage competitive or collaborative goals. Whereas most of our current 
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knowledge on status hierarchies suggests that high status actors work best with low status 
partners, I suggest that two high status actors can develop effective synergies when they are 
prompted to focus on shared goals. That is, collaborative settings may simultaneously allow high 
status actors to leverage the psychological benefits of self-perceived status beliefs while also 
reducing feelings of threat that decrease shared performance. This work adds nuance to prior 
findings by illuminating situational contingencies that influence status-based interactions.  
Together, these essays suggest that status is in the eye of the beholder. Status 
arrangements are not always the subject of shared consensus, but may also be the topic of 
perceptual differences. Moreover, situational characteristics may influence how status is enacted 
via behaviors. This work takes steps to unpack common theoretical assumptions regarding 
shared information, ideals, and self-interest. In doing so, I hope to illustrate that variation in the 
way in which status is perceived, achieved, and enacted has important implications for a range of 
workplace processes.   
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ESSAY ONE 
 SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF STATUS DISAGREEMENT 
 
We all develop beliefs about ourselves and the people around us in order to help us interpret 
our place in the social world. Of these beliefs, social status represents one of the most 
meaningful indicators of our value to others and greater society. Status, or a person’s relative 
position within a social hierarchy, refers to inequality based on differences in honor, esteem, and 
respect (Ridgeway, 2014). Those who possess status experience a wide range of social, material, 
and psychological benefits by virtue of their standing relative to others. In the workplace, high 
status is associated with social attention in the form of deference from others, access to material 
resources such as superior pay, and psychological rewards including high levels of autonomy, 
control, and well being (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Yet, both researchers and practitioners tend 
to assume that status is a static, universal outcome of social consensus, rather than a dynamic 
construct that is often the subject of conflict and disagreement. I propose that status 
disagreements, or occurrences when people have perceptual disagreements about their place and 
the place of others within a status hierarchy, are more common than previously assumed. 
Further, this work outlines the potential sources of status disagreement within the workplace and 
examines the consequences for people and organizations.  
Status is commonly defined as the level of prominence, respect, and influence commanded 
by an individual in the eyes of others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2002). In other words, status is 
viewed as a positional indicator of a person’s ranking within a particular social context 
(Ridgeway, 2014). Whereas researchers have been careful to highlight that status is by definition 
assigned by others, fewer studies have focused on how this process and its conclusions might be 
perceived by the focal person. This has led to many researchers overlooking the importance of 
how people see themselves and the extent to which this evaluation corresponds with the opinions 
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of others. That is, how do people formulate meta-perceptions about how they are viewed within a 
social context? The distinction between how people view themselves and how they are viewed 
by others and the space in between these perspectives is of critical importance, since people act 
upon their own perceptions but are subject, for better or worse, to the perceptions of their 
interaction partners. Further, there are at least two intriguing scenarios that sprout from a 
comparison of individuals’ beliefs about how they actually perceived by others and how they 
should be perceived by others in terms of their ranking within a social hierarchy. For instance, 
what happens when people are accurate about others’ perceptions, but believe that they deserve 
higher levels of respect than they are given? Further, what happens when people are inaccurate 
about how they are viewed, and overestimate the level of respect, prominence, and influence 
endowed upon them by social partners? Here, we refer to these possibilities as incidences of 
status disagreement.  
 With few exceptions, workplace research depicts the formation of social status 
hierarchies as systematically constructed (Berger et al., 1972; 1980), self-perpetuating and stable 
(Anderson et al. 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). According to this view, status hierarchies 
emerge from a process wherein all members reach agreement as to who is most and least 
deserving of status and arrange themselves accordingly.  Further, it is typically assumed that 
status hierarchies are stable in that those with high status are recognized as such by all, 
successfully claiming associated benefits in a universal manner. More recently, work has 
emerged that challenges this assumption, portraying status as a competition for dominance and 
power (Bendersky & Hays, 2012. Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, 2016). By elucidating how 
employees are motivated to climb the social ladder in order to reap relevant rewards (Anderson 
& Kilduff, 2010), such work underscores the importance of examining status as a domain of 
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conflict. Thus, while we are beginning to understand the frequency of divergent perceptions of 
status (Kilduff, Willer, & Anderson, 2016), we still know relatively little about the origins of 
status disagreement or the conditions that fuel its growth. If we are to assume that status is 
sometimes located at the center of social battle, we should benefit from an improved theoretical 
understanding as to why disagreement arises and in turn, how it sparks a range of work-related 
consequences for those involved. This work demonstrates how casting status as a context-driven 
process of subjective evaluation (e.g., Jensen et al., 2011; Podolny, 1993; Stewart, 2005) allows 
us to anticipate the divergence of group beliefs regarding the social hierarchy.  
 There are a number of reasons why it is important to advance our understanding of status 
as an unstable, dynamic construct arising from subjective evaluations. Our treatment of status as 
globally understood and recognized may lead us to make inaccurate predictions about how 
people react (or fail to react) to status. That is, we may overestimate the reach of status 
understandings and the benefits conferred to those who are considered high status in certain 
contexts, but not all. More specifically, we may overlook the extent to which status resides in the 
realm of subjective evaluations and individual beliefs that may or may not be shared or 
transferred to others. Further, by assuming that status is accepted and recognized by all, we run 
the risk of oversimplifying the dynamic between people’s self-evaluations and their judgments of 
others. In other words, we fail to account for the relational nature of status effects, and overlook 
the importance of subjective evaluative processes that are necessary to facilitate status-driven 
outcomes. That is, by not fully appreciating the mechanisms that underlie status, we may 
mistakenly adapt a narrow, or worse, imprecise understanding of who achieves status, who 
maintains status, and how or when status is recognized or ascribed by others.   
This work focuses on the phenomenon of status disagreement, or incidences where people 
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have differing opinions about their respective positions within a social hierarchy. I begin by 
reviewing relevant organizational research on status hierarchies and the smaller body of 
emerging studies that have begun to challenge existing assumptions about status consensus. 
Next, I demonstrate how this work can be linked to three primary sources of status disagreement: 
1) personal motives 2) information and 3) ideals In doing so, I attempt to identify the qualities 
that are expected to increase or decrease the probability of these effects. Finally, I present 
propositions that outline the likely consequences of status disagreement. 
The emergence of status hierarchies within groups 
In order to delve into the possibilities of perceptual asymmetry in regard to status, it is useful 
to consider the emergence of status by revisiting early understandings of the origins and 
functions of hierarchy. Throughout time, social science research has repeatedly demonstrated 
that status hierarchies emerge in all human social environments (Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010). 
Further, when status is not formally assigned, orderings will still emerge, even when there is no 
obvious differentiation between individuals (Bales, 1950; Fisek & Ofshe, 1970). Thus, it appears 
that humans have a natural tendency to organize themselves into a hierarchal structure (Tiedens 
& Fragale, 2003). 
While status orderings are believed to be a fundamental aspect of human life, the goals for 
hierarchy and mechanisms by which status emerges tend to be varied and complex. For this 
reason, more than one theoretical perspective has been presented to explain the origin and 
purpose of status hierarchies. This work clusters around two predominant views: the functional 
perspective and the dominance perspective. By and large, the functional perspective has been the 
most influential view to organizational research, demonstrating the value and utility of status for 
groups (Anderson et al., 2006; Blau, 1964; Berger et al., 1980; Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010; 
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Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Another important but less studied view, sometimes referred to as the 
dominance perspective, focuses on the motives and behaviors individuals use to obtain status.  
The functional perspective (or rational perspective) has long been the prevailing theoretical 
lens to understanding status hierarchy within organizational behavior (Bavelas, 1960), 
psychology (Thibault & Kelley, 1959), sociology (Davis & Moore, 1945) and economics (Frank, 
1985). Research in this tradition relies on the assumption that status differentiation is mainly a 
smooth, peaceful, cooperative process (Berger, Zelditch, & Cohen, 1972; Ridgeway, 1987). 
According to this view, once group members assess the amount of relative value provided by 
each person, everyone is assigned status and members organize themselves accordingly. In other 
words, group members are thought to develop an implicit consensus as to which individual 
characteristics are valuable and allocate status assignments based on the extent to which 
individuals demonstrate these attributes (Berger, et al., 1972).  It is further assumed that the 
status beliefs of group members reach a point of equilibrium and ultimate consensus. In this way, 
the purpose of status hierarchies is to create efficiencies and synergies that drive and sustain 
optimal group performance. 
Since groups include members who may or may not agree on particular goals, the best 
strategies to pursue these goals, or how to execute certain tasks towards these goals, the more 
specific functions of status hierarchy include 1) easing collective decision-making (e.g., 
Cartwright & Zander, 1953; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Van Vugt et al., 2008), 2) coordinating 
individual behavior so that members work towards increasing the quality of group process and 
outputs (Blau & Scott, 1962; Cartwright & Zander, 1953) and 3) motivating group members to 
contribute by providing status-related incentives (e.g., Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Willer, 2009).  
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First, status hierarchies are thought to aid in collective decision-making by giving 
disproportionate control to one or a few members (Van Vugt et al., 2008). Status hierarchies are 
expected to increase the quality of group decisions since individuals with high status are those 
who are seen as most competent, and thus, should be the most capable of making sound 
decisions on behalf of the group. In functional hierarchies, high status members are presumed to 
have the most knowledge and expertise. Indeed, a number of studies have shown that groups 
tend to give status to individuals who demonstrate superior abilities (for reviews, see Bass, 1981; 
Driskell & Mullen, 1990, Anderson, Spataro & Flynn, 2008). Other members recognize this 
status ordering by showing high status members respect by actively seeking their input, honoring 
their opinions, and supporting their goals and interests. Status-based interactions are a reflection 
and re-enactment of these shared group beliefs.   
Second, status hierarchies are expected to facilitate coordination by reducing conflict and 
guiding communication. In a group where all members have conflicting ideas, speak at once, and 
attempt to direct the behaviors of others, coordination suffers. Status hierarchies solve the 
problem of “too many cooks in the kitchen” by designating group leaders, who are allowed to 
direct others’ actions and make final decisions on the group’s behalf, while lower status 
members are expected to listen and defer to others (Bales et al., 1951; Berger et al., 1980; 
Keltner et al., 2003). Hierarchies are also thought to provide the structure and direction for 
information flow. In the prototypical pyramid, information travels up to group leaders, who then 
integrate this information and make decisions, which in turn, travel down and throughout the 
hierarchy (Arrow, 1974; Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 2005). At the same time, research has produced 
mixed findings in regard to whether status hierarchies facilitate or hinder group process 
efficiencies. For example, research has shown that status may also prevent upward 
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communication when team members remain silent to leaders to avoid negative judgment, blame, 
or other repercussions (Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974).  
Finally, status hierarchies are thought to motivate individuals to contribute to the group by 
offering social, material, and psychological incentives for those who achieve high status (Blau, 
1964; Willer, 2009). Group members who are perceived to provide the most value to the group 
are rewarded with greater ranking and accompanying respect and admiration, autonomy, power, 
and social support. For these reasons, recent work has likened the functional perspective of status 
to the idea of meritocracy (Anderson & Kennedy, 2012). For example, high status actors have 
the freedom and autonomy to make decisions and act in accordance to their own will, in contrast 
to low status actors who are expected to comply with the decisions of others, and may have less 
of a say in the work tasks they must complete. Moreover, in the end, those who are high status 
may assume a greater share of credit for the group’s success. Together, such status related 
rewards are thought to encourage group members to demonstrate their competence and value to 
the group.  
On the other hand, the dominance theory of status hierarchies tends to characterize the 
process of status allocation as a domain marked by conflict and competition, rather than peace, 
cooperation, and rational judgment (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Lee & Ofshe, 1981; Mazur, 
1985). According to this view, members within a given group will pit themselves against each 
other through demonstrations of assertive and sometimes manipulative behaviors in a battle for 
status during what is referred to as a dominance contest. Early studies by Mazur and colleagues 
(1985; Mazur & Booth, 1998) assert that while human hierarchies may be unique in some ways, 
status hierarchies retain important similarities across all animal species. A critical component of 
this model is that individual actors within a hierarchy engage in dominance acts, or behavior to 
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signal a claim on status they already possess or intend to take away from others (Mazur, 1989). 
Among humans, these behaviors typically include gestures such as tall, erect posture, wide 
stances, assertive facial expressions, or “stare downs” (Cheng et al., 2013, Henrich and Gil-
White, 2001, Rosa and Mazur, 1987). In a seminal piece of sociological work, Whyte (1992) 
focuses on status conflicts among members of street gangs, or what he calls “honor societies.” 
Some early organizational research follows in this tradition. For example, negotiated order 
theory argues that social order undergoes a process of constant (re) construction as members 
battle for status and assess, punish, or reward one another based on the extent to which traits and 
behaviors meet shared standards of legitimacy (Strauss et al., 1963).   
Whereas status may consist of different values across different situations, groups tend to 
value two main individual level characteristics. First, individuals must appear to possess 
competencies that are at the core of group’s goals and challenges (Driskell & Mullen, 1990; 
Ridgeway, 1987). Second, individuals must be evaluated as having collective interests, or be 
willing to use their capabilities to help others and contribute to the group’s success as a whole 
(Ridgeway, 1982; Willer, 2009). While the functional perspective explains why groups are 
concerned with individual competencies, it does not fully account for how individuals reconcile 
group goals with personal status-based rewards. Nor does it account for status hierarchies that do 
not reflect competence, as in cases where overconfident but underskilled members are rewarded 
with status (Anderson, Brion, Moore & Kennedy, 2012). On the other hand, the overt 
confrontation and aggression portrayed by the dominance perspective is less realistic within 
work groups, since such displays violate group values and expectations towards collective 
interests (Ridgeway, 1987).  
Further, the tension between these theoretical perspectives spills over into controversy 
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regarding whether status hierarchies facilitate or hinder group effectiveness. Empirical studies on 
this topic have produced mixed findings. The ubiquity of status hierarchies is often taken as 
evidence for its effectiveness for social functioning. Some empirical research supports this view, 
arguing that hierarchy is especially beneficial for groups with a high level of interdependence 
(Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, and Galinsky, 2012). However, other research has found that 
inequality reduces group functioning and performance. For instance, in cases where group 
members contribute equally to discussion, we observe improved group performance (Woolley, 
Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone, 2010). Moreover, inequality in pay has been shown to 
increase organizational turnover (Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006), and reduce individual 
performance in Major League Baseball (Bloom, 1999). Hierarchical differences have also been 
shown to hamper knowledge sharing, experimentation, and prioritizing shared goals, all of which 
hinder group learning (Bunderson and Reagans, 2011). This paper will offer an additional 
explanation, suggesting that these empirical inconsistencies are likely in part due to undetected 
disagreement among group members as to who should be allocated high versus low status.  
What is Status Disagreement? 
 
A modest group of studies provide empirical evidence to support the view that status 
assignments do not always reach consensus. An early study on group status focused on 
communication patterns discovered relatively stable inequalities between members in terms of 
who initiated and received messages, suggesting social consensus (Bales et al., 1951). Yet, a 
follow up study on explicit measures of individuals’ private perceptions found that consensus 
versus disagreement varied between groups, and thus, had important implications for group 
functioning (Heinicke and Bales, 1953). Since then, there has been little continued discussion of 
status disagreement. Instead the focus in this area has been on the emergence of significant 
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agreement in status perceptions (e.g., Anderson and Kilduff, 2009; Berger et al., 1972, 1980), 
even though perfect consensus is rare and high levels of group agreement may exist even in cases 
of disagreement between individuals (Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, 2016). 
Additional studies provide indirect support for the notion that status disagreement is common 
and likely has an important effect on group outcomes. For instance, team members have been 
shown to have differing perceptions of each other’s levels of expertise (Gardner & Kwan, 2012). 
Further, increasing attention has been placed on perceptual disagreement within groups along 
dimensions such as conflict (Jehn, Rispens, & Thatcher, 2010) and trust (De Jong & Dirks, 
2012). Such disagreement has been linked to a number of significant consequences, such as 
performance loss, decreases in team commitment, and a withdrawal of contributions (Kilduff et 
al., 2016). Together, these points suggest that we stand to make important theoretical advances 
by revisiting our assumption of consensus within work teams.  
Moreover, recent research has found that conflict that emerges over status disagreements has 
an independent effect that is stronger and more detrimental to group performance than other 
types of conflict, including relationship, process, and task conflict (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). 
Other studies have focused directly on the individual behavior of those engaged in explicit 
competition over status. For instance, research focused on Wall Street sell-side equity analysts 
found that groups including several high-achieving individuals suffered from declines in team 
performance (Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein, 2012). These studies suggest that when too many 
individuals within a team perceive themselves as high status, group processes are interrupted and 
team performance suffers. In other words, overt disagreement diverts energy and effort towards 
conflict and away from group productivity (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). Whereas these studies 
rely on the presumption of open and explicit status contests, this work expands the domain of 
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status disagreement in line with Kilduff and colleagues (2016) to suggest that divergence in 
individuals’ private but uncontested perceptions may be equally detrimental to group 
functioning. Using the aforementioned studies as a building block for the current research, I 
elaborate on the specific sources of status disagreement and expand the range of potential 
consequences for this phenomenon. 
According to the functional perspective of status outlined above, status understandings 
represent a foundational organizing framework for group members. That is, group members rely 
on their own status understandings to coordinate themselves and interact effectively with each 
other. In this way, status orderings work to solve the problem of collective decision making, 
improve the quality of group decisions, and incentivize members to put their best foot forward in 
response to the promise of status-related rewards. If members within a team attempt to formulate 
status perceptions about one another and this process does not reach a point of agreement, it 
stands to reason that groups experience lower levels of effectiveness. This disagreement may 
happen both within and outside of individuals’ awareness, however, in both cases, it is expected 
that groups will experience an adverse impact on functioning and performance. That is, status 
disagreement may emerge from the same negative processes it perpetuates: segmented, 
uncoordinated decision-making, low quality decisions, and independent, or selfish (rather than 
group motivated) motives. Further, since individuals have a natural inclination to arrange 
themselves according to a status hierarchy, their attempts at creating order have deeper and more 
far-reaching implications than other forms of disagreement. 
More recently, Kilduff and colleagues (2016) have delineated between three types of status 
disagreement: 1) upward disagreement, which occurs when two group members both believe 
they rank above the other in a status hierarchy, 2) downward disagreement, which occurs when 
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two group members both believe they rank below the other in the group’s hierarchy, and 3) 
third-party disagreement, when two group members disagree about the relative position of one 
of the other group members (who is uninvolved in the disagreement). Since low status positions 
are comparatively less desirable, this work argues that upward disagreement is the most 
prevalent and harmful type of disagreement. Further, disagreement over high status positions is 
likely to be more detrimental to group functioning, since high status members are assigned 
greater expectations and responsibilities for the group.  
However, there are also particular scenarios that may not be captured by these categories, but 
should have detrimental effects at both individual and group level analysis. That is, there are 
likely combinations of both third-party disagreement and upward agreement, or vice versa. 
Further, downward disagreement may also complicate these effects. For example, Steven might 
think that she’s higher status than both Bob and Charlie, which both Bob and Charlie agree with. 
She also may think that Bob is higher status than Charlie, which both Bob and Charlie disagree 
with. These mis-matched perceptions will likely lead to a number of important effects. However, 
our current theoretical understanding of status disagreement remains unclear about how to 
account for the combined effects of perceptual asymmetry.    
For the purpose of this paper, I will take a broader view to focus on the antecedents, 
moderators, and outcomes of both dyadic and third-party status disagreement. Since the sources 
of status disagreement may be varied and complex, it seems most appropriate to revisit our 
assumptions regarding how status perceptions emerge in the first place and how they are shared 
within groups in the workplace.    
The Potential Sources of Status Disagreement 
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I propose that status consensus is not as seamless as it may appear, and that status 
disagreement, incidences where people disagree about their standing and the position of others 
within a hierarchy, are relatively common. The presumption of status consensus represents 
several problems. First, there is a common knowledge problem, or the issue that it is impossible 
for more than one individual to have an identical experience or perception of the world. This 
problem obstructs the capability of groups to organize themselves on the basis of common 
understandings. Second, there is the issue of social evaluation, or the subjective process of 
prioritizing shared goals and values. Members within any given group likely have varying 
opinions as to how to approach a task, this results in divergent perceptions about which group 
members’ skills are most useful and valuable. Finally, there is the issue of mixed motives. That 
is, it is likely that certain individuals will strive to attain status within a group, even if others 
have superior skills that are better suited for group success.  
These problems are grouped into three main categories that carry distinct themes but intersect 
and overlap: 1) personal motives, 2) ideals, and, 3) information. It is proposed that variation 
among individuals within these categories will lead to the emergence of status disagreement. 
First, group members do not typically have access to objective information about each other’s 
level of knowledge, skills and abilities. To the extent that individuals are unfamiliar with one 
another, this means they must rely on superficial cues (e.g., personality perceptions). For 
example, the quiet behavior of an introverted colleague may be interpreted as a sign of lack of 
knowledge or things to contribute by some group members, whereas others may have past 
experience and direct observation of the same introvert’s high level of skill and expertise. 
Second, group members may have varying opinions as to which skills and individual 
characteristics are most valuable to the group’s success. For example, whereas highly tenured 
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members might believe that seniority is most essential for team productivity, others with industry 
experience might favor specialized knowledge. Finally, since status is associated with certain 
benefits, it is likely that some individuals will be motivated to enhance their own contributions 
while demeaning the value of others in order to secure personal rewards. These behaviors may be 
convincing to discerning observers but not others, leading to variation in status perceptions. 
An integration of social information processing theory and self-serving bias literature allows 
us to make certain predictions about when status disagreements are most likely to emerge. First, 
self-serving bias, or the perceptual tendency to hold views that enhance one’s self-esteem, helps 
explain the role of personal motives in formulating status perceptions. Further, according to 
literature on social information processing, social information influences human judgment, 
thought, and action when the information is clear and easy to understand (Daft & Lengel, 1984; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the salience and visibility of the information is high (Fiske, Kenny, & 
Taylor, 1982), and the information is credible. I argue that situational features often determine 
the clarity and visibility of information, whereas the credibility of information is determined 
through a valuation process related to certain ideals.  
Personal Motives 
 
The desire for status is an important human motive (Anderson, Hildreth & Howland, 2015). 
As a representation of a person’s position within a social ranking system, social status is a 
meaningful benchmark people use to evaluate their own self-worth and social esteem. Further, a 
well-established tenet in our understanding of human behavior is that people are fundamentally 
motivated by self-interest (Schwartz, 1987). In many organizational settings, status comes with a 
range of benefits, including instrumental rewards such as promotions, interpersonal rewards such 
as deference, or image-based rewards such as prestige (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). To the extent 
   
 22 
that individuals believe they deserve such rewards or see an opportunity to make a claim to 
valuable resources, they are expected to be motivated to compete to secure a position at the top 
of the status hierarchy. I discuss how individual characteristics such as dominance, cultural 
values such as individualism, and situational factors such as competition are each expected to 
amplify self-interest and increase the likelihood that individuals may misperceive their social 
standing or act in a way that causes disagreement in the eyes of others. 
 A substantial body of work on motivated perception (e.g., Kunda, 1990, Taylor & Brown, 
1988), suggests that certain individuals may have a tendency to perceive themselves as higher in 
status than others. In other words, such individuals might possess inflated perceptions of the 
value of their own characteristics, skills, and knowledge as a result of self-serving biases. It 
follows that they may be more attentive to their own contributions to the group, and value their 
own work above others (Epley et al., 2000). Empirical evidence supports this view, with studies 
showing that individuals sometimes inflate the importance of their specific attributes to attain 
higher status (Owens & Sutton, 2012). For example, a group member may announce and frame 
the group needs according to what they believe is their strongest asset. Building on past findings, 
I describe how particular individual traits are closely linked to status striving motives. Next, I 
discuss the less explored but likely possibility that situational characteristics may also fuel this 
psychological mechanism.  
 Dominance. High levels of dominance within a group are likely to strengthen the 
relationship between self-interest and status disagreement. When individuals are high on trait 
dominance, they are more likely to think and act in self-interested ways. That is, trait dominance 
makes individuals more vulnerable to self-serving biases. In turn, this is likely to lead to status 
disagreement, or cases when individuals within a dyad both think of themselves as higher status 
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than the other. Studies have repeatedly found that individual characteristics are related to status 
striving behaviors. A cumulative analysis of 85 years of research shows that the personality trait 
dominance is the strongest predictor of who emerges as a leader within a group, above any other 
individual factor taken into consideration, including intelligence (Cummins, 2015). Trait 
dominance is explained as a preference for having authority over others and a tendency towards 
assertive behavior. In one study, individuals who scored high on dominance were rated as more 
competent by their teammates, which led them to be assigned higher relative status and influence 
compared to others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Notably, this effect occurred despite the fact 
that dominant individuals were actually no more competent than less dominant others, as evinced 
by standardized test scores and performance on group tasks. This effect was determined to occur 
based on the increased confidence conveyed by dominant individuals through behaviors such as 
taking the initiative to actively suggest answers and volunteering information believed to be 
relevant to problem solving tasks (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). More recently, Kilduff and 
colleagues (2016) have demonstrated a link between dominance and status disagreement. 
However, missing from existing research is an account of what happens when several members 
of a group are high on dominance. That is, we are uncertain as to whether or not dominance itself 
creates status disagreement, or if it is configural dominance that leads to perceptual variation. I 
posit that the higher the levels of dominance within a group, the more individuals will be 
engaged in status striving, which will ultimately create high levels of group-level status 
disagreement. 
Proposition 1a: The level of individual trait dominance within a group is positively 
related to group-level status disagreement, such that the greater the number of dominant 
individuals, the higher the level of status disagreement.  
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 Cultural Orientation. Cultural orientation influences status is many ways. In addition to 
informing the valuation system used to evaluate and assign status (Torelli et al., 2014), research 
suggests that the meaning of status is qualitatively different across cultures, with individualists 
viewing status as a means to advance their own self-interest, and collectivists viewing status as a 
means through which to support the interests of others (Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). It follows that 
across cultures, people report different levels of motivation to achieve status and commit effort 
to making their status known to others.   
 Whereas individualistic cultures are characterized by independent self-construal and 
social competition, collectivistic cultures are more likely to nurture ideals and values that relate 
to interdependence and collaboration. Building on these common understandings of cultural 
differences, researchers have found that individualists are more likely to integrate status into 
their own self-concept, whereas collectivists are more likely to see status as a social role. That is, 
individualists are more likely to attribute their social standing to their own notions of individual 
superiority. On the other hand, collectivists are more likely to see their status position as a 
reflection of their responsibility towards others. In this way, they see their status position as 
having relational rather than personal implications. Since individualists take status rankings more 
personally than collectivists, it is more likely that status disagreements will arise between two 
individualists. From a group-level perspective, it follows that the more individualists there are 
within a group, the greater the number of potential status disagreements.   
Proposition 1b: The level of individualism within a group is positively related to group-
level status disagreement, such that the greater the number of individualist (vs. 
collectivist) group members, the higher the level of status disagreement.    
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Fixed Pie Perceptions. In addition to individual characteristics, situational factors are 
expected to contribute to the incidence of self-interested motives.  It is expected that high levels 
of perceived competition within a group will strengthen the relationship between self-interest and 
status disagreement. A cognitive bias that has been explored at length within negotiations 
literature is the fixed pie bias, or the belief that one’s own interests are in direct and absolute 
opposition to others (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000).  While it is evident that individuals tend 
to arrange themselves into similarly structured hierarchies composed of fixed rankings 
(Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015), research also suggests that this bias leads to people to 
lose out on potential integrative gains (Liu, Liu & Zhang, 2016). Further, the cognitive frames, or 
mental models that people use to approach such situations, are not always fixed, and can even be 
adjusted into “win-win” cognitive frames (Liu, Liu, Zhang, 2016). I posit when individuals have 
competitive mindsets, or the perception of “fixed pie” or “winner takes all” structures, an 
individual may be more inclined to view their value system as diametrically opposed to those 
whose values seem to differ from their own. From this point of view, the difference between 
assuming a high and low status position within a hierarchy is high stakes, since the “winner” 
takes all while leaving nothing for everyone else (“losers”). Thus, individuals will be encouraged 
to behave in ways that promote their own self-interest and are likely to hold onto views that 
support this behavior, increasing the likelihood of status disagreement.  
From a group-level perspective, it follows that those who adopt “win-win” cognitive 
frames are less likely to rank themselves more highly than others within a team. Upward status 
disagreement is defined as incidences when people believe themselves to be higher status than 
each other. Thus, I predict that the more members who hold “fixed pie” perceptions there are 
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within a group, the more likely they are to subjectively outrank each other, and thus, create status 
disagreement.  
Proposition 1c: The level of “fixed pie” perceptions within a group is positively related 
to group-level status disagreement, such that the greater the number of individuals with 
“fixed pie” perceptions, the higher the level of status disagreement.   
Information 
 
An aspect of status evaluations that is less discussed but of critical importance is the fact that 
people are rarely presented with identical sets of information about their interaction partners or 
their environment. Moreover, when presented with the same information, people do not always 
arrive at the same conclusions. Since status orderings are context-driven, individuals’ 
perceptions of one another are confined to a short, narrow and idiosyncratic history of domain 
specific behaviors. People also filter information through a subjective lens. For these reasons, I 
suggest that variation in access to information is a relatively common feature among work 
groups. Further, this variation in access to information may feed situational ambiguity that 
ultimately lays the foundation for the emergence of status disagreement.  
A necessary precondition for employees to reach consensus about their own and others’ 
social standing is the recognition and similar interpretation of certain status-based cues. That is, 
individual status perceptions require that meaningful differences between members of an 
aggregate be identifiable (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Shils, 1965). The tendency for 
individuals to seek out and interpret distinct social features as signals of competence and value 
provides the basis for work on status characteristics theory. Importantly, status characteristics 
provide cues that may vary to the extent to which they are 1) observable and 2) produce uniform 
perceptions of competence and value across perceivers. Both aspects may create the potential for 
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divergent status evaluations among members of the same group (Kilduff, Willer, and Anderson, 
2016).  
There is ample evidence that people rely on noisy signals of aptitude in order to determine 
whose ideas or expertise are deserving of deference as the group attempts to accomplish work 
related tasks (e.g., Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Joshi, 2014; Thomas-Hunt, Ogden & Neale, 
2003). Scholars have highlighted that individual demographic attributes, including gender, race, 
ethnicity, educational background, and tenure, function as status markers that signal competence 
across a broad range of situational contexts (Shils, 1968). In turn, these characteristics predict the 
level of respect received from others (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Bunderson, 2003; Cohen 
& Zhou, 1991; Ridgeway, 1991). Status characteristics are typically split into two categories: 1) 
specific cues, which include those that are directly related to the task, such as education and 
tenure, and 2) diffuse cues, which are characteristics that have no obvious or direct relevance to 
the task, but are still believed to convey aptitude in a given domain (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; 
Jackman, 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Ridgeway, 1991). Both diffuse and specific cues 
operate in a similar manner. While specific cues give direct information about a person’s 
potential aptitude in providing value to the group, diffuse cues give indirect signals, through 
general expectations of competence, as to whether or a person will make valuable contributions 
to the group’s success (Joshi & Knight, 2015).   
Visibility and Clarity of Specific Status Cues. Whereas specific status characteristics (e.g., 
skills, expertise) are expected to produce more accurate expectations of potential value to group 
members, they may also be less observable than diffuse cues (e.g., gender, age) (Bunderson and 
Barton, 2011), and thus, more subject to variation in visibility and clarity (Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994; Fisher, Ilgen & Hoyer, 1979).  There are many examples of potential 
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variation in access to information brought about by the nature of tasks that may have low or high 
levels of visibility. In practice, variation in visibility and clarity of specific cues creates status 
inefficiencies. For instance, we might imagine an employee who is highly competent at a low 
visibility task such as technical analysis, but less comfortable with a high visibility task such as 
public speaking.  Further, his nervousness might lead him to deliver a clumsy and confusing 
presentation to colleagues, despite possessing a high level of expertise. In this case, his 
competence at technical analysis may inspire confidence from group members who are familiar 
with their competencies, while remaining less accessible as relevant information to others. In 
another example, a manager at a retail store might make a point to post sales reports ranking 
employees according to how much revenue they have generated. This should create a high level 
of visibility around the employee’s salesmanship, however, it could be possible that the 
employee secures sales by being deceptive to customers. Unless return rates and customer 
satisfaction scores are also posted along with sales rankings, these skill deficiencies are probably 
less visible to onlookers.   
While not directly related to visibility, another source of variation in access to information is 
disconnected membership and participation across social groups and contexts. In modern 
workplaces, team membership may shift frequently and employees may be members of multiple 
teams (O’Leary, Mortensen & Woolley, 2011). Thus, the issue of shifting contexts hinders the 
growth of familiarity between teammates which would allow them to establish shared 
perspectives on the task, goals, and each other (Wageman, Gardner, & Mortensen, 2012)  The 
fact that people may have membership in contexts where individuals’ skills are highlighted 
influences their level of familiarity and distance from one another. For instance, legal and 
medical professionals have been shown to have very different relative standings in the eyes of 
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“insiders” versus “outsiders” of their career networks (Abbott, 1981). In another example, an 
immigrant may have high social standing in their country of origin, but lower comparative status 
in the place where they are resettling. In such cases, status understandings may diverge as the 
result of access to distal versus proximal cues.  
Proposition 2a: The level of visibility of work contributions within a group is negatively 
related to status disagreement, such that the higher the visibility rating of members’ 
contributions, the lower the level of status disagreement.   
A second potential issue arising from specific status characteristics (e.g., skills, expertise) is 
potential variation in clarity, or ease of understanding. This is further complicated when 
members of a group have different levels of knowledge and expertise. For example, a person 
may have highly specialized knowledge that is at the same time invaluable to the group’s 
success. It is possible that certain members will have a knowledge base that is closer to the 
person in question. In this case, these members might act as intermediaries that are able to assess 
the value of a team member, however, other members might be more doubtful of this person’s 
value, or even misattribute their skills to a colleague who is better at communication. 
Indeed, there is a body of research that examines the elaboration of task-relevant information as a 
team-level resource (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). According to this view, elaboration of 
information includes the exchange and integration of ideas and knowledge relevant to the task. 
However, since expertise is by definition a specialized level of knowledge and understanding, it 
may not easily be understood or appreciated by others within a group. It follows that whereas 
some group members might see the value in a particular skill set, others might have a weaker 
understanding, and thus, devalue the contributions that they fail to understand. For these reasons, 
I posit that the clarity of information in the eyes of others is a likely source of status 
   
 30 
disagreement.  
Proposition 2b: The level of clarity of work contributions within a group is negatively related 
to status disagreement, such that the higher the group-level clarity ratings of members’ 
contributions, the lower the level of status disagreement.     
Visibility of Diffuse Status Cues. In contrast to specific characteristics related to knowledge 
and expertise, diffuse status characteristics such as age, race and gender, are easily observable. 
People tend to use cognitive shortcuts to make inferences about others, otherwise referred to as 
stereotypes. In some cases, these stereotypes are used because of a lack of information, whereas 
other times, stereotypes assist in the simplification of information. A long history of research on 
status expectations in small groups has found that certain social characteristics that are imbued 
with societal value, such as gender and race, influence the contributions of group members as 
well as the extent to which these contributions are valued (Ridgeway, 1987; Thomas-Hunt et al., 
2003). At the societal level, men are generally perceived as having higher levels of competence 
than women and thus deserving of higher relative status (Ridgeway, 2001). These findings 
extend to racial differences, as evinced by studies showing that White employees are viewed as 
more highly effective and are also evaluated as having more leadership potential than non-
Whites (Rosette, Phillips, & Leonardelli, 2008). Since diffuse status characteristics tend to be 
highly observable cues, it is likely that people will rely more heavily on diffuse status 
characteristics in order to infer the competence and value possessed by group members, 
especially in ambiguous situations. This possibility is discussed further in later sections related to 
legitimacy and ideals.  
Contextual Ambiguity. While the visibility and clarity of status cues creates transparency 
and consistency regarding how individuals see themselves and how they are viewed within a 
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particular social context, situational factors might also interrupt the way that these cues are 
applied. That is, in contexts that lack objective performance metrics, it may be highly unclear 
which individual contributions or capabilities are most crucial for success. Whereas some fields 
are characterized by intangible skills such as knowledge work, others might be marked by rapid 
change, such as technology. In both cases, it may difficult to “stay ahead of the curve” as 
performance standards are often elusive. Similarly, firms or groups may employ multiple 
strategies in order to manage high levels of uncertainty. For example, the field of higher 
education is driven by both academic and athletic status rankings (Lifschitz et al., 2011), but it is 
arguably more difficult to disentangle the specific influence of each. Yet, for schools with high 
status, both dimensions are typically treated as an opportunity to capitalize on a competitive 
advantage.  
Proposition 2c: The level of contextual ambiguity within a group is positively related to 
status disagreement, such that the higher the level of group contextual ambiguity, the higher 
the level of status disagreement. 
Differences in information are expected to be especially common in early stages of group 
formation and highly influential to status orderings. While the functional theory of status 
hierarchies predicts that groups engage in re-shuffling as they become more familiar with each 
other’s value and contributions to the group, empirical evidence does not support this view. 
Instead, studies suggest that status hierarchies are established early and are highly resistance to 
change, demonstrating a hardening effect (Anderson & Kilduff, 2010). This paper provides an 
additional perspective to this effect, suggesting that it is people’s subjective perceptions of the 
status hierarchy that develop early and show little signs of adjustment as time goes on. While not 
always shared with others, these perceptions provide the basis for corresponding behavior. Thus, 
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it is expected that to the extent that variation in access to information and the interpretation of 
status cues influences status beliefs during the early stages of group formation, such beliefs are 
likely to become formative as the group reaches maturity. Thus, it is expected that the effects of 
differential access to information are especially common when members are becoming 
acquainted with one another as members of the same group, and increase in salience as the group 
reaches maturity. 
Based on previous discussion, I expect that status disagreement, or instances wherein two 
people within a team both perceive themselves as having higher status than the other, are likely 
to emerge in conditions where there is a high level of variation in access to social information 
and clarity of social information. Unsurprisingly, low levels of familiarity and clarity regarding 
others’ skill set within a group is expected to create a moderate level of status disagreement due 
to increased ambiguity. However, this effect should be significantly exacerbated by group 
variation, wherein some group members have high levels of familiarity or clarity, and other 
group members report relatively low levels of these constructs.  
Ideals   
 
 While the problem of common knowledge is one hurdle, it is not the only issue that 
hinders status consensus. Even if individual members have access to a similar set of information 
and reach a common understanding, they may develop inconsistent interpretations as to the 
priority of each others’ skill set, and thus, have conflicting views as to whose skills provide the 
group the highest level of value. Unlike the issue of access to information that is clear and easy 
to understand, this scenario involves differing opinions as to the type of skills and contributions 
that should be prioritized in order to achieve group success. It follows that disagreement of this 
kind will lead to dissensus regarding who belongs at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy. 
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Here, I refer to conflicting opinions regarding which dimensions should be used to assign status 
as variation in valuation criteria, or subjective ideals. Since the issue of conflicting ideals 
emerges from social interaction, these propositions are expected to occur at the group level.  
 Heterogeneity. There are a number of reasons why people within the same group might 
have differing opinions about which skills or competencies are most important for group 
performance. Building on prior research, I suggest that highly diverse groups, comprised of 
members from different backgrounds, experiences, and skill sets are likely to develop unique 
value systems. In particular, I argue that teams characterized by high levels of within-group 
dissimilarity are likely to possess divergent beliefs about which behaviors and characteristics 
help fuel group processes and ultimately lead to high performance outcomes (Van Knippenberg, 
De Dreu, & Homan, 2004; Kirkman & Shapiro, 2005). In order to illuminate the role of 
heterogeneity in the formulation of divergent status evaluations, I will turn to a discussion of 
legitimacy.  
Legitimacy. As previously discussed, social information processing theory posits that social 
information is most influential not only when information is observable and clear, but also when 
the information is credible (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Fisher, Ilgen & 
Hoyer, 1979). At the intersection of external information and internal values, is the socio-
cognitive process that involves an assessment of credibility, or validity, between the two.  In 
order to elaborate on the credibility criteria, it is useful to refer to the broad literature on 
legitimacy (Ridgeway, 2001). Within the sociological tradition, legitimacy is a term used to 
describe how actors are evaluated based on their consistency with cultural beliefs, norms, and 
values. This evaluative process includes both a 1) cognitive dimension that construes actors 
based on valid, seemingly objective, characteristics, and a 2) prescriptive component that 
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consists of whether an actor’s characteristics or behavior is perceived as morally right. Most of 
the research in this area focuses on explaining why demographic characteristics are associated 
with status expectations that vary for members of different groups (Johnson et al., 2006; 
Ridgeway, 2001). It is posited here that a high level of heterogeneity within groups is associated 
with the enactment of different schemas of legitimacy, and thus, is likely to create status 
disagreement.  
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that heterogeneity in members’ status characteristics 
will spur differences in the amount of value and influence members’ are assumed to possess 
within groups (Johnson et al., 2006). More specifically, group members with diffuse status 
advantages (e.g., White men) are more likely to become assertive and influential in decisions and 
become leaders than members with diffuse status disadvantages (e.g., Black women) (Johnson et 
al., 2006). Yet this consequence is inefficient since members who are status advantaged are not 
always the same members who are in fact more competent and influential (Weber & Foschi, 
1988, Wagner & Berger, 2002). Of course, exceptions exist when women or minority employees 
become leaders as a result of other characteristics related to performance expectations, such as 
seniority or expertise. However, studies show that those whose status characteristics are 
inconsistent with these titles are more likely to face resistance from subordinates (e.g., Eagly & 
Karau, 2002). In this case, widespread status-related beliefs created at the societal level have 
accumulated comparatively higher levels of cultural support (i.e., authorization and 
endorsement) for those with diffuse status advantages in comparison to those with diffuse status 
disadvantages (Cornell & Ridgeway, 2003). Typically, individuals such as these find themselves 
with weaker levels of within-group endorsement and normative expectations for compliance.  
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It follows that heterogeneous groups are more likely to include individuals whose diffuse 
status characteristics (e.g., gender, race) are incongruent with their specific status characteristics 
(e.g., skills and expertise). That is, diverse groups are likely to include members with high levels 
of competence and expertise but are status disadvantaged according to greater society. Since 
diffuse status characteristics are more observable than the latter, however, it is likely that some 
group members may mistakenly rely on these cues in order to assign colleagues’ with lower 
relative status. At the same time, it is possible that status disadvantaged individuals may 
demonstrate their skills while onlookers discount their competencies due to cognitively 
perceived invalidity (e.g., Eagley & Karau, 2002). 
 Further, there is evidence that cultural values influence how people perceive status. This 
work has direct implications for variation for the prescriptive component of legitimacy, or the 
extent to which status is associated with what is morally right. For example, whereas those from 
individualistic cultures have been shown to value demonstrations of competence and dominance, 
those from collectivist cultures tend to value displays of helping and generosity (Torelli et al., 
2014). In one study, Americans were less likely than Polish individuals to comply with a request 
from a leader with low competence, whereas Polish individuals were less likely to comply with a 
request from a leader without relational skills (Wosinska, et al., 2009; see Leslie and Gelfand, 
2011 for a review of similar findings). This suggests that individuals evaluate, recognize, and 
react to the status of others based on a set of values that varies between individuals.   I predict 
that differences in ideals within a group are applied according to two primary dimensions of 
evaluative legitimacy, including prescriptive and cognitive lenses.  
Proposition 3a: The level of heterogeneity within a group in terms of both personal and 
skill-based characteristics is positively related to status disagreement, such that the 
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higher the level of heterogeneity, the higher the level of status disagreement. .      
Proposition 3b: The level of evaluative legitimacy of others’ skills within a group is 
negatively related to status disagreement, such that the higher the level of evaluative 
legitimacy, the lower the level of status disagreement.   
 The topic of status disagreement is just beginning to emerge as a possibility within work 
groups. However, the previous discussion suggests that it is a characteristic that is likely 
frequently overlooked, as illustrated by the fact that potential drivers are varied and wide-
ranging. I have grouped the origins of status disagreement into three primary dimensions that are 
expected to vary in the degree to which they are shared: information, ideals, and self-interest. 
These dimensions are conceptualized as closely related but distinct approaches to the 
phenomenon of status disagreement. Further, while this work is meant to provide an overview of 
likely effects, it is possible that there are additional sources of status disagreement that have not 
yet been considered.  
The Consequences of Status Disagreement 
 
The concept of status disagreement in and of itself departs from our traditional understanding 
of status hierarchy. As such, it is a construct that has escaped the attention of most researchers, 
but necessarily influences the dynamics and consequences of status within workgroups and 
organizations. While status disagreement within groups may sometimes remain undetected, I 
argue that it nonetheless produces important consequences for individuals and workgroups. In 
the following sections, I will outline how perceptual status disagreement may spur a series of 
negative experiences for individuals that likely interrupt the development and maintenance of 
group processes and ultimately diminish group performance.  
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As mentioned, we are only beginning to understand the occurrence and outcomes of status 
disagreement. While certain scholars have shown that explicit team disagreement over status 
diverts energy and effort towards conflict and away from group productivity (Bendersky & Hays, 
2012; Groysenberg, Polzer & Elfenbein, 2012), more recent work suggests that private status 
disagreement operates instead through another mechanism: reduced motivation (Kilduff et al., 
2016). In turn, this decline in motivation leads to withdrawal of contributions and reduced group 
performance. These studies suggest that when too many individuals within a group perceive 
themselves as high status, group processes are interrupted and performance suffers. While such 
studies offer important findings for our treatment of status disagreement, they do not elaborate 
on the specific reasons why group members lose motivation or choose to engage in conflict. 
Further, scholars have only recently begun to move beyond the presumption of open and explicit 
status contests to explore the effects of perceptions of status that might diverge privately (Kilduff 
et al., 2016). The present work will attempt to add precision and robustness to extant findings by 
suggesting that private status disagreement likely leads to a broad range of psychological and 
affective states, with a complex range of consequences for individuals and groups.  
 
Individual Outcomes 
 
 While high status appears to be tied to lower levels of baseline levels of negative affect 
and stress, those who see themselves as high status also tend to respond to acute status threats 
more intensely than others (Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010). For example, in an experiment where 
high status participants were asked to complete challenging speech and arithmetic tasks in front 
of an audience, they found that those who had higher self-reported levels of status (reported 
being more “respected”, “esteemed,” and “admired” than others) had the most elevated levels of 
   
 38 
physiological stress response to this task and perceived social evaluative threat (Gruenfeld & 
Tiedens, 2010). One explanation for this effect is that those who see themselves as high status 
tend to place higher value on this hierarchical position than others. In another example, when 
Blader and Chen (2012) randomly assigned participants to a high status negotiation role, 
participants became increasingly concerned with whether or not their negotiation partner treated 
them with respect. Pettit, Yong, and Sparro (2010) also conclude that people are more concerned 
with losing status than possible gains to status. These findings suggest that those who perceive 
themselves as high status hold certain standards and expectations that others recognize them as 
such. When these expectations are not met, as is predicted in the case of status disagreement, I 
argue that individuals are more likely to experience feelings of threat and low levels of control. 
 Status orderings guide patterns of behavioral interaction at a micro-level, such that higher 
status individuals are shown signs of deference and respect. However, in cases of status 
disagreement, wherein two individuals both perceive themselves to be higher status than the 
other, individuals’ expectations for how others should treat them are likely unmet. That is, a 
person who views themselves as high status may find that their interaction partners withhold acts 
of deference, failing to treat them in the way they feel they deserve. These interaction patterns 
might include behaviors such as ignoring their suggestions, interrupting or challenging their 
opinion, offering unsolicited guidance, or failing to acknowledge or praise their contributions. At 
a basic level, incongruence between a person’s self-views and how their colleagues perceive 
them can negatively affect one’s feelings of coherence and control (Polzer, Milton & Swann, 
2002). Conflicting status expectations should exacerbate this effect, as evinced by research on 
dominance complementarity, which finds that people are most comfortable with interaction 
partners who complement, rather than mimic, their levels of dominance behavior (Tiedens and 
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Fragale, 2003, Tiedens et al., 2007). In addition to the discomfort of a one-time offense, the fact 
that interaction partners have differing perceptions of one another’s status suggests that a 
dynamic of conflicting expectations may become a frequent, if not normative aspect of the 
relationship.  
Proposition 4a: Status disagreement is positively related to individual perceptions of 
personal threat.  
Further, individuals who perceive their own relative value and contributions as relatively 
higher than others, but do not experience dyadic affirmations of this view are likely uncertain of 
their role within the group. Role ambiguity occurs when an individual does not understand his or 
her responsibilities and goals for the job (Sawyer, 1992). A common version of role ambiguity 
arises when individuals are uncertain of their boundaries, leading to anxiety. For example, a 
person might consider herself to be an expert on a given topic, but find that certain group 
members do not follow their guidance on a relevant task. Not only will this experience be 
threatening to self-perceptions of status, but it will also challenge how a person categorizes his or 
her unique contribution to others. This is expected to lead to role ambiguity, and a perceived lack 
of control over the behavior of others and their future within the workplace (Ashford et al., 
1989).  Moreover, this experience of role ambiguity as an outcome of status disagreement is 
unique from other forms of role conflict in that status disagreement necessarily involves the 
perceived value and worth of an individual in the eyes of his or her teammates. In this way, 
conflict and ambiguity does not arise from differences alone, but also from the way in which 
individuals value these differences. Further, judgements of this type involve a person making 
self-evaluations in relation to others. That is, a person may believe that they are high status, and 
this belief by definition might imply that they perceive others as low status, or beneath them. In 
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instances of disagreement, it follows that this personal belief of worth may remain unvalidated 
by the actions, values, and behaviors of others.  
Proposition 4b: Status disagreement is positively related to individual perceptions of role 
ambiguity.  
Proposition 4c: Status disagreement is negatively related to individual perceptions of 
control.   
Beyond the experience of personal offense, research from the justice literature suggests that 
individuals attend to fairness and justice information in order to affirm their value and belonging 
to the group. In instances where group members feel disrespected by their peers, they may 
retaliate. This retaliation can be overt, as when members engage in open challenges or attacks 
against one another (Bendersky and Hays, 2012). However, retaliation may also take on a more 
subtle form, as when members withhold task contributions and become unwilling to comply with 
collective goals (Kilduff et al., 2016). In both cases, it is expected that the feelings of group 
commitment will decline since members’ expectations are unmet or violated through social 
interactions. Groups perform at their peak level when all involved behave as members of a 
group, rather than as distinct individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher 
& Wetherell, 1987). However, if group members receive social information that they feel 
violates their own perceptions of self-concept, they will engage in either individualist or 
collective coping strategies. In the case of status disagreement, since people rate themselves 
more highly than at least one another group member, it is expected that this experience will lead 
to lower levels of group identification.   
Proposition 4d: Status disagreement is negatively related to individual perceptions of group 
identification.  
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Group Outcomes 
 
Status disagreements have unique implications for groups, since they necessarily implicate 
all members of a given hierarchy. Holding the behavior of other group members equal, if two 
members of a group both perceive themselves as having higher status than the other, they may 
read the behavior of the other person as a potential threat to their position. Thus, they may be 
more likely to engage in self-interested behaviors in order to preserve their own perception of 
self-dignity and stature, even to the detriment of the group. A handful of studies have suggested 
that explicit status disagreements inhibit group functioning in at least one critical manner, that is, 
the reduction of information sharing (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). Group members engaged in 
status disagreements tend to withdraw their contributions to the team, which in turn, reduces 
team performance (Kilduff & Anderson, 2016). Thus, status disagreements can be harmful not 
only for those directly involved, but other group members as well.  
There are a few potential ways that status disagreement might hamper group level outcomes. 
A closely related stream of research on transactional memory systems suggests that individuals 
within a group function best when they are aware of each other’s potential and actual skill set 
and contributions to group tasks (Wegner, 1987; Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004). However, 
status understandings move beyond the location of differences since status is an indicator of 
personal worth and value relative to others within a given team. Indeed, scholars have 
theoretically and empirically demonstrated that disputes over status have a stronger negative 
impact on the group than task, relationship, or process conflicts, since they have long term 
implications, include the participation of bystanders and allies, and involve distributive 
outcomes, or win-lose situations (Bendersky & Hays, 2011). First, research on both role theory 
and status hierarchies suggests that patterns of interaction based on status differentiations are 
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cumulative, and past dynamics are likely to set the tone for future behaviors. For example, if 
Jack interrupts Steven and effectively silences his contribution, or takes credit for his idea and is 
acknowledged by other group members, it is likely that in the future, the group will solicit the 
opinion of Jack before they ask Steven to contribute. However, if Steven perceives his status to 
be higher than Jack then he may challenge his contributions rather than defer to him. Further, 
according to the functional perspective, status hierarchies serve the purpose of organizing 
members in a way that facilitates efficient information and communication flows, since certain 
members are expected to give direction while others carry out orders. However, if multiple 
members are demonstrating leadership behaviors, by directing the tasks of others and overseeing 
the quality of their performance, then other group members may become uncertain as to whose 
advice to prioritize, leading to inconsistencies and process loss.  
Further, the occurrence of status disagreements implies that certain members will not receive 
the deference and respect they feel entitled to, which should lead to cumulative feelings of threat, 
stress, and intra-group defensiveness that will likely prevent them from positively contributing to 
the group. For example, employees who feel they are higher status others may discount other 
members’ contributions even when they are valid. In addition, if an employee undergoes feelings 
of constant threat due to a lack of deference from one or more other group members, they may 
become more focused on boosting their superior image in the eyes of others and less focused on 
ways to create actual value. 
Proposition 5a: Status disagreement is negatively associated with group coordination. 
Proposition 5b: Status disagreement is negatively associated with group process gains.  
Proposition 5b: Status disagreement is negatively associated with group performance.  
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The purpose of this paper was to build on recent discussions around perceptual disagreement 
within groups and illuminate the various potential sources of status disagreement. This 
discussion was organized around three main sources of status disagreement, including variation 
within groups in information, ideals, and self-interest. Each of these categories represents 
particular salient aspects of status emergence, while highlighting the possibility of perceptual 
disagreement. While the traditional approach to status within organizations assumes that status 
rankings are the result of shared consensus, there are many reasons, outlined here, to question 
this assumption. A consideration of these dimensions may allow us to predict cases when status 
hierarchies fail to provide the structure and functioning that is presumed to facilitate group 
performance. In more practical terms, there are instances when employees within the same 
organization may informally decide to follow different “leaders.” This work provides a number 
of reasons as to how and why this occurs.   
The propositions developed here should serve as motivation for future research. Thus far, 
only a few researchers have tackled the complexities and outcomes of status disagreement 
(Kilduff et al., 2016; Gardner 2010). However, a discussion of related research bolsters the 
notion that status disagreement is more common than previously assumed. Further, the 
consequences of this phenomenon influence individual-level psychological, affective, and 
behavioral outcomes that ultimately impact group functioning. If dyads within a group fail to 
behave on one accord, the entire group will be affected. Thus, the possibilities outlined here 
deserve further examination, since they suggest a number of implications for both researchers 
and practitioners within organizational behavior.  
Directions for Future Research 
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While beyond the scope of the current work, future research should explore the more specific 
effects of various configurations of status perceptions within groups and organizations. For 
example, it would be interesting to study a dyad of individuals who are engaged in a constant 
battle for status within a team that has otherwise reached a general consensus about the status 
ordering. We can imagine that one person would benefit from this form of status disagreement 
while the other is penalized, due to a lack of group endorsement and support. Further, it would be 
interesting to study the effects of status disagreement when matched with other positional 
characteristics, such as formal authority, power, or access to organizational resources and 
control. Again, it is possible that one person might have enough resources to safely engage in 
status disagreement, without personally experiencing negative effects. On the other hand, 
engaging in status disagreement might be more costly for someone who is relatively powerless. 
Further, these cases should be extended to examine their potential effects on group processes and 
outcomes.  
While this work is focused primarily on private perceptions of status disagreement, future 
work should examine the point at which private perceptions spill over into public status 
challenges. I expect that perceptions of legitimacy and in particular, the distinction between 
validity (the extent to which group values match those of greater society) and endorsements (the 
extent to which people believe that others’ recognize and support status assignments) play a 
particularly important role in individuals’ evaluations of the risks or rewards involved in 
claiming or granting status. Further, it would be interesting for future research to expand upon 
the potential role of status disagreement to break down illegitimate hierarchies and rebuild those 
that are better reflections of group values and perhaps more useful to group functioning.    
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Additionally, future studies should examine how the degree to which the effects of status 
disagreements are contingent upon levels of status. For instance, it is likely that members who 
consider themselves the highest status members within a group, occupying a single position at 
the top of the hierarchy, will experience more intense feelings and behaviors as a result of 
upward status disagreements than those who still see themselves as high status, but relatively 
further down the hierarchy.  
I propose here that conflicting findings regarding the effectiveness of hierarchies are likely 
due to disagreement that has thus far been overlooked. Another explanation is that hierarchy is 
not as fundamental for group functioning as we have assumed. Social identity theories suggest 
that people are most satisfied, committed, and engaged when they are able to maintain both 
positive esteem and a high level of distinctiveness. Future studies should explore whether or not 
horizontal differentiation is more effective for group functioning and performance than vertical 
status hierarchy in certain situations, as posited by the contingency perspective (Anderson & 
Brown, 2010) or if status orderings always reproduce themselves.  
Emotions have also been shown to play a role in the transmission of status signals. For 
example, the expression of anger has been associated with high status (Tiedens, 2001), which 
suggests that those seeking status may strategically regulate their emotional expressions (Clark, 
1990). An underexplored possibility is that people may also read and respond to emotional 
displays differently. For instance, whereas some group members may have the most respect for 
the person who confidently displays anger, others might lose respect for the same person by 
interpreting displays of anger as a lack of control and competence in performing the group task. 
The potential for emotional expressions to signal different levels of status for different perceivers 
is another interesting area for future research.  
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 We are only beginning to grasp the occurrence and implications of cases when people 
have varying opinions about who belongs at the top and bottom of a social hierarchy. This work 
represents some of the first steps towards a broader consideration of the possibilities of this 
phenomenon, as well as the span of impact perceptual disagreement has for both individuals and 
groups within organizations. Status disagreement is a complex and nuanced subject, yet, the 
implications of this topic continue to occur below the radar of much of our discussion regarding 
status. As such, it is important that researchers continue to expand our understanding of status 
(dis)agreement so that our collective body of knowledge may begin to account for the perceptual 
intricacies that determine how status is interpreted, ascribed, and acted out within the workplace.  
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ESSAY TWO:  
HOW DOES IDEOLOGY INFLUENCE  
STATUS PERCEPTIONS? 
 
We are increasingly shedding light on the image of status as a battleground of conflicting 
perceptions (Anderson & Kilduff, 2016). Yet, we know little about how individual differences 
might influence how people attain, maintain, and ascribe social status to others (Anderson & 
Kilduff, 2009; Anderson, Spataro & Flynn, 2008). This oversight presents a unique opportunity 
to explore the role of ideological differences in the development of status perceptions. Social 
dominance orientation (SDO) theory suggests that people generally subscribe to one of two 
competing worldviews: 1) hierarachy-enhancing beliefs, which tend to tolerate and even support 
hierarchy and inequality between groups, and 2) hierarchy-attenuating beliefs, which value 
equality, opportunity and the distribution of resources between groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
I posit that differences along this dimension determine the degree to which individuals associate 
status with principles of self-reliance, hardiness, and know-how, versus the association of status 
with social responsibility, interpersonal warmth, and trust. These ideological distinctions are 
important for workplace practices, since they may mean the difference between how people 
within organizations are valued and ultimately, who gets hired, fired, or promoted within 
organizations. Further, an enhanced understanding of ideological differences allows us to predict 
how people within an organization may have diverging opinions regarding how to effectively 
seek status and which behaviors provide the most value to the workplace.  
Social status is defined as the prominence, respect, and esteem conferred to an actor in the 
eyes of others (Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; Zelditch, 2001). Most of the research examining the 
purpose and outcomes of status draws on the functional perspective (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 
1953; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Van Vugt et al., 2008). According to this perspective, people 
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within a group evaluate each other according to their actual or potential usefulness in pursuing 
shared goals. From this point of view, the process of status attainment and conferral is by nature 
an honest and well-intentioned enterprise. That is, individuals within groups strive to assign 
status to those who are most deserving. Individual actors receive high status as a reward for their 
valued contributions to the group. In turn, group processes are made more efficient by 
developing patterns of deference towards those that are seen as most capable of making sound 
decisions. Further, status distinctions provide an incentive for actors to contribute to group 
functioning and the achievement of goals. In this way, workplace evaluations become stable and 
normalized since those who are accorded high status are the same people who are trusted to 
make important group decisions as well as those who determine which criteria should be valued. 
Since the assignment of status involves a normalized process of social evaluation, this process is 
likely to impact some of the most critical decisions made within organizations, including who is 
hired among a pool of potential job applicants, who is promoted to lead a team of ambitious 
employees, and who is given credit for superior performance. Yet, extant research has yet to 
fully consider the subjective lens through which status understandings emerge. I posit that 
previous studies have oversimplified the process of social evaluation by underestimating the role 
of individuals’ subjective belief systems as a determinant of cognitive judgment. 
While the functional theory of status helps illuminate the cognitive and social motives that 
drive the emergence of status hierarchies, this research tradition offers little explanation for the 
fact that groups commonly disagree about who belongs at the top and bottom of a given status 
hierarchy. We know that status disagreements are generally detrimental to group functioning 
(Kilduff et al., 2016; Bendersky & Hays, 2012), however, we know less about why these 
disagreements emerge in the first place. Further, this research tradition does not explain how 
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status inefficiencies, or instances when status is the source of conflict, disagreement, or process-
based errors, are surfaced and sustained. That is, why do characteristics that have little or no 
relationship with an individual’s actual value or contributions predict status achievement? For 
example, overconfident individuals have been shown to achieve status within groups, even 
though their assertiveness is unrelated to their competence relative to less assertive others 
(Anderson & Kennedy, 2012). Similarly, physical attractiveness shares a positive relationship 
with status (Horai, Naccari & Fatoullah, 1974; Maddux & Rogers, 1980). Further, while 
demographic characteristics such as race and gender are unreliable signals of individual skill, 
competence, and social value, these cues reliably predict workplace evaluations (Fiske, Cuddy, 
& Glick, 2007). For example, men are evaluated more positively than women, and minorities are 
often judged more harshly than their counterparts. 
I argue that ideological differences may help illuminate why individuals may have differing 
opinions about who is most deserving of respect and esteem. Further, a greater consideration of 
individual ideology may help us do more to account for the possibility of dysfunctional 
hierarchies. A rich tradition of research has used social dominance orientation (SDO) to explain 
how ideology influences workplace attitudes and beliefs. Social dominance orientation (SDO) is 
defined as “the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the 
domination of ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’ groups” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 48). SDO 
derives from theoretical assumptions that all societies reflect group-based hierarchies, with those 
at the top possessing a disproportionate amount of social value and resources, and those at the 
bottom possessing a negative share of social value. Given these observations, SDO represents an 
individual-level ideological belief that captures the extent to which individuals support hierarchal 
orderings or are motivated to work towards greater equality. Elitists, or those who score highly 
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on SDO, are referred to as hierarchy-maintaining, or enhancing, and support principles of 
inequality, hierarchy, and competition. On the other hand, egalitarians, or those who score low 
on SDO, are considered hierarchy-attenuating actors, who are motivated by the desire to increase 
equality and expand opportunities across levels of hierarchical differentiation. The underlying 
difference between these two schools of thought lie in subjective values that embrace the tenets 
of self-reliance, hardiness, and know-how, vs. principles related to social respect, interpersonal 
warmth, and interdependence.   
Although values might shift across groups, groups members generally assign status to 
individuals using two primary dimensions: competence and collective interests (Berger et al., 
1972). That is, group members, when determining an organizational hierarchy, will assess one 
another on the basis of how well-equipped a person is to carry out a work task (competence), as 
well as how likely they are to use their skills and expertise in service of group needs and goals 
(warmth). This is a key component of the social development of status hierarchies, since a person 
may be highly skilled but also prone to act in self-interested ways, at the expense of the group. 
Similarly, a person may play a very active role in contributing group functioning and helping the 
collective membership succeed, but lack certain skills and expertise relative to others. Indeed, 
prior work has convincingly shown that task and situational factors may amplify the importance 
and attention paid to each of these dimensions (Fragale, 2006; Berger, Rosenholtz & Zelditch, 
1980). That is, while each dimension is important to group-based perceptions such as social 
status, the salience of competence and collective interests may vary based on additional factors.  
Interestingly, these dimensions map onto the rich tradition of person perception research 
(Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006), which provides a framework for social evaluation along the 
fundamental dimensions of competence and warmth. While warmth refers to such traits as 
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friendliness, kindness, and trustworthiness; competence represents such things as intelligence, 
efficacy, and skill. These dimensions are the foundation of person perception because they help 
individuals first assess if someone is a friend or a foe, that is, if a person intends to be kind and 
considerate, or if, they are self (vs. other) interested. Next, the competence dimension helps 
individuals evaluate how capable a person is in carrying out goals that will either benefit others, 
or benefit themselves. These two dimensions repeatedly arise in studies on person and group 
perception. The Ohio State leadership studies (Stogdill, 1948, 1974) distinguish between 
“consideration” (warmth in terms of approachability and concern) and “initiating structure” 
(competence-orientation, in terms of role/task clarity and performance standards). These 
concepts continue to serve as the basis for leadership research, where styles are thought of as 
various combinations of warmth and competence. For example, authoritarian or autocratic 
leadership emphasizes competence while sacrificing warmth, whereas democratic or 
participative styles emphasize a leader’s warmth at the expense of skills and expertise (Chemers, 
1997). Further, similar to the development of status-related research, studies on situational 
leadership have argued that authoritarian, or participative leadership styles are more or less 
appropriate given other factors, such as the type of task or stage of the relationship (Vecchio, 
1987; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969).  
In both the status research tradition and the area of person perception, these dimensions are 
used as fundamental evaluation criteria for reasons that ultimately guide interaction patterns 
within the workplace. Additionally, the importance and attention paid to each these dimensions 
may vary based on situational, task-based, and, as is argued in this paper, individual factors. 
Thus, while research on workplace status and person perception are very similar, they have also 
taken on unique theoretical interests and motivations. While both traditions argue that status and 
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warmth are important, status researchers tend to emphasize competence judgments. On the other 
hand, Fiske and colleagues (2016) argue that information about warmth is more cognitively 
accessible, more predictive, and more heavily weighted than competence. Missing from both 
approaches is a consideration of how individual ideologies may motivate individuals to be more 
or less attentive to competence vs. warmth, or vice versa.  
Indeed, some scholars suggest that an emphasis on the status-competence link reflects taken 
for granted assumptions of universal values. More recently, this perspective has been supported 
by empirical findings that focus on how cultural orientation predicts the way that people attain 
status and ascribe status to others (Torelli et al., 2014). Whereas those with an individualistic 
cultural orientation tend to emphasize personal goals of achievement, success, and self-reliance, 
collectivistic cultures emphasize sociability and interdependence (Triandis, 1995). These 
differences are non-trivial, as evinced by findings that collectivists tend to engage in status-
striving by demonstrating helpful behaviors, and individualists attempt to achieve status by 
demonstrating their skills and expertise (Torelli et al., 2014). Moreover, these distinctions guide 
how people judge and evaluate others, with individualists ascribing higher status to actors who 
display autonomy and expertise, and collectivists conferring higher status to actors who exhibit 
pro-social behaviors (Torelli et al., 2014). This paper will extend these findings to suggest that 
status evaluations are grounded not only by a broader cultural lens, but also by more personal 
views about the nature of social hierarchies and inequalities. 
There is reason to believe that the way that people make sense of status hierarchies within the 
broader context of society influences how they perceive and assign status to actors within the 
workplace. A well-established body of research shows that differences in social dominance 
orientation (SDO) predict a range of important outcomes, including individual values, job 
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preferences, and biases in allocating resources (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994). A range of organizational policies and practices has been spurred by egalitarian 
beliefs, including policies such as Affirmative Action, minimum wage, and unionization 
practices. Indeed, studies have found that those high on SDO are reliably opposed to Affirmative 
Action policies (Aquino, Stewart, & Reed, 2005; Federico & Sidanius, 2002).  
At a more granular level, individual ideologies have been shown to influence discriminatory 
beliefs, with those high on SDO showing higher levels of bias against underrepresented groups 
but also displaying a respect for authority (Unzueta et al., 2014; Umphress, et al., 2008; Aquino, 
Stewart & Reed, 2005). This makes sense, given elitists’ support of existing hierarchal orderings. 
Similarly, foundational work on social dominance orientation demonstrated that people seek 
work roles that are compatible with their SDO levels. Early researchers grouped work roles into 
“hierarchy-enhancing,” or those that are primarily aimed at protecting, serving, or benefiting 
elite members of society (e.g., politics, police, law) and “hierarchy attenuating”, or work roles 
that are more beneficial for the common good (e.g., teachers, healthcare services). They 
discovered a positive relationship between self-reported SDO and whether students intended to 
enter hierarchy-attenuating or hierarchy-enhancing career paths (Pratto et al., 1994). Moreover, 
work in this area also emphasizes the role of institutions in reinforcing ideologies. That is, the 
match between individuals’ attitudes and institutional goals is one of mutual contribution and 
reward. One study of a police department found that police officers with the most civilian 
complaints for brutality and excessive force also received some of the most positive performance 
evaluations from their supervisors (Christopher et al., 1991). These findings demonstrate the 
taken for granted links between ideology, behavior, and rewards between people and institutions.  
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While SDO is a well-validated measure of ideology, since the early years of its development, 
there have been few follow up studies focused on examining the foundational mechanisms that 
undergird its predictive power for higher-order societal attitudes. That is, there is a lack of 
research that explicitly examines how the support or rejection of attitudes related to SDO affects 
social judgments and evaluations. I posit that a lack of knowledge in this area presents a prime 
opportunity for us to advance our understanding of the elusive space between individual 
ideologies and shared (or divergent) status understandings.  
Part I: How does ideology influence status-seeking behaviors? 
 
 People are thought to think, feel, and behave in ideologically meaningful ways (Jost, 
2006). That is, whether or not individuals are aware of where they stand within a hierarchal 
order, they adapt beliefs that either implicitly support and approve of existing hierarchal 
arrangements, or, conversely, they adapt beliefs that challenge the merit or legitimacy of 
hierarchal orderings. As a guiding principle, then, ideologies influence individuals by motivating 
their behaviors. The workplace is a particularly salient place for individuals to embody their 
belief systems, due to the variety of roles that are involved in the continuous reproduction of 
local status hierarchies.  
 Since elitists, or those who are motivated by hierarchy-enhancing beliefs, tend to endorse 
social inequalities, it is predicted that they are more likely to subscribe to the belief that 
individuals should be independent and self-reliant. That is, elitists mostly believe that people 
already possess the resources that they are entitled to. As such, this belief system is more 
accurately embodied through independent behaviors, rather than interdependent behaviors that 
focus on expanding opportunities and potential progress for others. On the other hand, 
egalitarians, or those who are motivated by hierarchy-attenuating beliefs, tend to see social 
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inequalities as a problem. Thus, egalitarians are predicted to be more likely to take on warm, 
supportive roles that are focused on helping others and being considerate towards their needs. 
Since egalitarians believe that the hierarchy-attenuating is a noble cause, I predict that they are 
likely to demonstrate related behaviors when trying to win the respect and admiration of others.   
H1a: SDO is positively related to the attitude that people should pursue status via 
competence-related behaviors.   
H1b: SDO is negatively related to the attitude that people should pursue status via 
warmth-related behaviors.   
Method 
  
Prior to the actual study, the SDO scale and the items for status striving were presented to 
subject matter experts (10 faculty and graduate students) who helped revise the SDO (Sidanius, 
Pratto, & Malworth 2014) and competence/warmth behavior scales (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 
2002) used in prior research. The SDO scale was revised based on input from faculty (see 
Appendix A) to bring the targets down from the societal level to the individual level, as seems 
most appropriate for a study on individuals in organizations. Additionally, certain items were 
removed because they were broad or de-contextualized. For the competence/warmth behavior 
scale, faculty and students provided suggestions to revise these items in a way that reflected 
practical behaviors that might be typical to a workplace, in general (see Appendix B). In 
addition, preliminary data was collected via 10 survey responses, including qualitative and 
quantitative data, in order to ensure consistency between suggested status-related behaviors and 
the scale items. Next, an a priori power analysis was conducted to estimate a target sample size 
using G*Power analysis. After specifying a model with t-tests using linear multiple regression to 
observe a single regression coefficient, the analysis suggested a target size of 56 participants to 
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capture a small effect size of .20, with a desired statistical power level of .95 and probability of 
.05.  
In total,133 participants were recruited (47% male, 66% Caucasian, mean working 
experience = 14 years), from a variety of backgrounds and industries, with an inclusion criteria 
of at least 2 years of work experience. Participants were recruited via Qualtrics, which is an 
aggregator of panels. Qualtrics works with a number of panel providers. Each panel has its own 
method of recruitment, though all are fairly similar. Typically, respondents can choose to join a 
panel through a double opt-in process. Upon registration, they enter some basic data about 
themselves, including demographic information, hobbies, interests, etc. When a survey is created 
that the individual would qualify for based on the information they have given, they are notified 
via e-mail and invited to participate in the survey for a given incentive. Incentives are given on a 
point system. These points can be pooled and later redeemed in the form of gift cards, Skymiles, 
credit for online games, etc. For this study, when converting points to monetary value, on 
average, participants were compensated $1 for their completion of the survey.  
Participants were asked to identify behaviors that should be demonstrated to gain status (i.e., 
“What should someone do to gain respect and admiration from supervisor/colleagues?”) They 
were then asked to rate the importance of twelve behaviors using a 7 point scale (1=almost 
never, 7 = very frequently). Additionally, participants were given the opportunity to list 
behaviors that were not represented by the given categories. Participants were also asked to rate 
each item in terms of the extent to which they signal competence (“To what extent does this 
behavior suggest that one is competent, capable, and intelligent?”) and warmth (“To what extent 
does this behavior suggest that one is interpersonally warm, good natured, and sincere?”). After 
completing this survey, subjects completed a revised version of the Social Dominance 
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Orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994) scale, which asks them to rate 
the extent to which they are high on hierarchy attenuating or hierarchy enhancing beliefs, (e.g., 
“In an ideal world, all people would be equal,” “It is sometimes necessary to step on others to get 
ahead in life.” 
Results 
 
To assess the construct validity of the Competence/Warmth and SDO multi-item scales, a 
confirmatory factor analysis was performed using Mplus. For the Competence/Warmth scale, the 
data was fit to a two-factor model (competence and warmth) which revealed reasonable fit (CFI 
= .66, RMSEA = .20), and was somewhat better than the fit of a single-factor model (CFI = .61, 
RMSEA = .21, Δχ2= 88, p < .01). For SDO, after observing select poor loadings for a single 
factor model, further analysis revealed that a two factor CFA model (egalitarianism and 
dominance sub-scales) fit the data reasonably well (CFI = .95, RMSEA = .09) and showed 
improvement over a single factor model (CFI = .69, RMSEA = .24, Δχ2= 256.5, p < .01). The 
results of this analysis demonstrated that there were two sub-scales embedded in the SDO scale. 
Indeed, more recent research on social dominance orientation suggests that SDO-D is a sub-scale 
that captures preferences that support systems of inequality and dominance via forceful, overt 
oppression, while SDO-E is a distinct scale that reflects a preference for inequality via more 
subtle hierarchy-enhancing ideologies (Ho et al., 2015). Follow up analyses were conducted 
using each of these sub-scales as distinct predictors, however, no significant results were found.    
To analyze the results of the main predictive model, a simple linear regression was calculated 
to predict the relationship between social dominance orientation and patterns of categorizing 
effective status seeking behaviors. Warmth and competence-signaling behaviors were specified 
as independent variables and social dominance orientation as a dependent variable. A significant 
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regression equation was found, demonstrating that SDO was positively related to the attitude that 
competence-signaling behaviors (b = .12, p = .02, R2 = .04, 95% CI .016 to .22) are appropriate 
ways of gaining status, while SDO was negatively related to the statement that warmth-signaling 
behaviors (b = -.18, p = .00, R2 = .08, 95% CI -.28 to -.08) should be used to gain status.  
Discussion 
 
The results of this study suggest that social dominance orientation is a meaningful 
ideological difference that predicts how people think others should seek status within the 
workplace. That is, those that are high in SDO are much more likely than those who are low in 
SDO to state that people should demonstrate competence related signals and behaviors. On the 
other hand, those that are low on SDO are more likely to state that people should demonstrate 
warmth related behaviors to gain the respect and esteem of others. These findings suggest that 
the implications of ideological difference extend to beliefs regarding differences in appropriate 
behaviors. This has important implications for status in the workplace, since managers and 
employees alike may employ strategies that may or may not be recognized by others. For 
example, an employee who is high on SDO might believe he should demonstrate self-reliance by 
working on a project independently, whereas another employee who is low on SDO may believe 
he should engage in more helping behaviors. A manager who observes these differences might 
believe that one employee is more motivated to obtain esteem and recognition in the workplace, 
when each person may be equally motivated to gain respect and status. It follows that ideological 
differences likely have an important influence on beliefs regarding effective status-related 
behaviors within the workplace.  
Part II: How does ideology influence status conferral? 
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Just as ideologies become guiding principles for behaviors, so should ideology influence 
social judgment. That is, if we expect ideologies to influence the means through which people 
attempt to gain status, individuals should also possess the belief that the same set of behaviors 
should be rewarded. It follows that while organizational behavior literature on personnel 
selection and hiring and sociological literature on the effects of ideology have developed as 
separate streams of investigation, the process of hiring job candidates is an inherently subjective 
process of evaluation. While some recent research has brought light to the process of 
organizational matching with candidates as an interpersonal exchange of cultural matching 
(Rivera, 2012), less work has developed this perspective to identify the role of ideology on status 
granting as an organizational practice.  
One of the most critical ways that status evaluations have implications for organizations 
is through processes of personnel selection, or hiring. Whereas hiring research acknowledges that 
similarity often drives perceptions of the desirability of candidates, this work has limited its 
focus to attention of similarities in sex or race (Elliot & Smith 2004; Gorman, 2005). Further, 
such demographics are often treated as proxies for deeper level similarities such as shared 
culture. However, we know that demographic factors are only a part of individuals’ identities, 
and similarity predictions are often moderated by other variables (Ely, 1995), which suggests 
that demographic differences alone do not always substitute for differences in values or 
subjective ideals.  In a neighboring field of research, studies on person-organizational fit often 
assume that organizations and people represent objective entities of characteristics that 
complement or supplement one another. However, missing from this perspective is a 
consideration of how organizations are often represented by individuals (e.g., recruiters, hiring 
managers) who possess their own set of subjective values, beliefs, and interests. While there is 
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comparatively little research that directly focuses on similarity between hiring managers and 
potential candidates (for an exception, see Cable, 1996), there is evidence that subjective 
preferences may result in the formulation of unique and specific criteria. For example, recruiters 
have been shown to put job candidates at the top of the list when they discover shared interests, 
such as being a fan of the same sport (Rivera, 2012). If superficial commonalities override 
otherwise “objective” criteria, it makes sense that individuals’ deep rooted ideologies in regard to 
the favorability of hierarchy and inequality might influence perceived value similarity, and 
subsequent status evaluations.   
As mentioned, status is accorded to those who are considered to provide or have the 
potential to offer valuable resources and contributions that assist in the accomplishment of 
particular goals. Thus, elitists, or those high on SDO, are expected to confer status on those who 
are seen as competent and self-reliant, while valuing the warmth dimension as less valuable to a 
legitimate, functioning hierarchy. That is, since those who score highly on SDO believe that 
inequality is a hard fact of life, it is predicted that they will have higher respect for those with an 
independent mindset. Such individuals may appear as if they have ‘rightly’ accepted this 
ordering and are willing and ready to compete. On the other hand, egalitarians, or those who 
score low on SDO, are expected to reward individuals who demonstrate warm behaviors with 
comparatively higher status, since such behaviors are more associated with egalitarian values and 
beliefs.  It follows that those high on SDO will consider behaviors that are related to warmth as 
actions worthy of admiration and high regard.  
H2a: The relationship between SDO and status evaluations is moderated by competence, 
such that the relationship between SDO and status evaluations is positive when 
competence is high and negative when competence is low.  
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H2b: The relationship between SDO and status evaluations is moderated by warmth, 
such that the relationship between SDO and status evaluations is positive when warmth is 
low and negative when warmth is high.  
Method  
 
To test these hypotheses, the same sample of individuals as used in Part I were told they 
would be presented with excerpts from cover letters from hypothetical job candidates. The cover 
letter varied along dimensions of warmth and competence. The cover letter excerpts were 
presented to SMEs (a small group of 10 graduate students and faculty) who participated in a 
matching exercise and were asked to guess which category was represented by each of the 
excerpts. The SMEs confirmed that the cover letter excerpts accurately represented one of 
desired four categories – high warmth and low competence, high competence and low warmth, 
high warmth and competence, and finally, low on warmth and competence. For the high 
competence candidate, their personal statement included items such as “I pride myself in 
delivering superior work with minimal guidance or direction,” “My high level of expertise 
allows me to work independently,” “I always deliver results, by any means necessary”, and 
“Performance is the key to business.”, in combination with low warmth statements. The 
candidate who is high on warmth had personal statement phrases such as, “Relationships are the 
key to business”, “As a leader, I think it is important to develop the skills and talents of others”, 
“I am passionate about providing opportunities for others”, and “I excel at building quality 
relationships,” In combination with low competence statements. Finally, participants were 
presented with candidate information for subjects high in both warmth and competence and low 
in both warmth and competence. In the case of candidates who were low in both warmth and 
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competence, statements were included such as, “One day, I would like to gain the skills required 
to work independently, and “I hope to gain the skills to work well with others.” 
After reading a candidate’s cover letter excerpt, participants were asked to evaluate his or her 
status according to five items (high-status, respected, admired by others, high prestige, regarded 
highly by others) along a seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). After 
completing this survey, subjects completed a revised version of the Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994) scale, which asks them to rate 
the extent to which they are high on hierarchy attenuating or hierarchy enhancing beliefs, (e.g., 
“In an ideal world, all people would be equal,” “It is sometimes necessary to step on others to get 
ahead in life.” 
Results  
 
 A manipulation check was included to check whether participants perceived a significant 
difference between candidates in terms of competence and warmth based on the experimental 
conditions to which they were assigned.  The manipulation check included 4 items to check how 
warm candidates were perceived (e.g., “This is a good natured person,” “This is an 
interpersonally warm person”) in addition to 4 items to check how competent candidates were 
perceived as being (e.g., “This is a competent person,” “This is a capable person”). The 
manipulation check was analyzed by conducting a t-test to compare means across groups. After 
each condition was dummy coded (0,1), the results of the manipulation check indicated that there 
was a statistically significant difference between high and low warmth conditions. There was a 
homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .674). The 
mean warmth rating for those assigned to low warmth conditions (m = 4.18, sd =1.55) was -.58 
lower than (95% CI, -1.00 to -.15) those assigned to high warmth conditions (m = 4.76, sd = 
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1.35). There was a statistically significant difference in mean ratings between conditions t(129) = 
-2.68, p = .008. However, there was not a statistically significant difference detected between 
high and low competence conditions.  The homogeneity of variances test as assessed by 
Levene’s test for equality of variances was violated (p = .015). The mean competence rating for 
those assigned to a low competence condition (m =  5.25, sd = 1.25) was -.26 (95% CI, -.59 to 
.085) lower than those assigned to a high competence (m = 5.51, sd = .92) condition, although 
this difference was not statistically significant t(129) = -1.48, p = .144.   
 To analyze this model, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted. The 
data was organized so that the results of status evaluations from all candidates was aggregated 
into one status rating variable. Then, each condition was dummy coded according whether 
candidates were meant to represent high (1) or low (0) warmth and competence. First, 
competence was examined as a moderator of the relationship between social dominance 
orientation and status evaluations. Two variables were entered in the first step of regression 
analysis: social dominance orientation (b = -.01, p = .96, ns), and competence (b = -.12, p = .64, 
ns). The overall model did not account for a significant amount of variance F 2,130 = .11, p = .89, 
ns.  In the second step of the model, the interaction term was added (b = .15, p = .47, ns), and the 
overall model did not improve in terms of variance explained ΔR2 = .00, F3,129 = .25, p = .47, ns. 
This model yielded nonsignificant results, demonstrating that neither competence nor SDO alone 
or entered as an interaction term share a meaningful relationship with status evaluations.  
 Since the manipulation check was unsuccessful in prompting participants to detect 
differences between high and low competence candidates, I conducted additional analyses to 
assess the effects when omitting those who “failed” the manipulation check, or did not associate 
high and low competence candidates with their desired conditions. The results remained 
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nonsignificant. That is, when re-running the above analyses, the overall model did not account 
for a significant amount of variance F 2,108 = .14, p = .87, ns. It follows that the specific 
predictors, including SDO (b = .04, p = .67, ns), competence (b = .31, p = .21, ns), and the 
interaction term (b = .32, p = .22, ns), were also un-meaningful predictors of status ratings.  
Next, warmth was examined as a moderator of the relationship between social dominance 
orientation and status evaluations. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted and 
social dominance orientation and warmth were entered in the first step. The overall model 
accounted for a significant amount of variance F 2,129 = 3.99,  = .021. However, while warmth (b 
= .68, p = .01, 95% CI .20 to 1.16) was a significant predictor, SDO was not (b = -.01, p = .93, 
ns). In the second step, the interaction term was added, however the model did not improve 
ΔR2 = .00, F3,128 = .20, p = .66, ns. Further, SDO (b = -.05, p = .70, ns), warmth (b= .42, p = .50, 
ns) and the product term (b = .09, p = .66, ns) were not significant.1 These results rule out the 
potential for a moderation effect. 
Part III: How does ideology influence performance evaluations? 
 
As mentioned, the functional theory of status asserts that status assignments serve the 
purpose of identifying individuals who are most capable of performance. In other words, 
individuals attend to cues such as competence and warmth to ascertain the level of potential 
value offered to a given group. These assessments feed a self-fulfilling prophecy, wherein high 
status individuals are given a greater range of opportunities and resources to perform well. 
Beyond this initial boost, there is evidence that high status individuals, in comparison to low 
status individuals, are also rewarded with more favorable performance reviews for identical 
                                                 
1 The ANOVA for this regression equation including the interaction term reported significance 
(p = .05). This is likely due to multicollinearity (VIF range 6-8). 
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behaviors (e.g., Berger, Rosenholtz, & Selditch, 1980; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). It follows that 
the way in which people assign status has a rolling, positive effect on how the performance of 
high status individuals is evaluated in the future. Thus, I expect that elitists will give higher 
performance evaluations to those who demonstrate competence behaviors, and egalitarians will 
give higher performance evaluations to those who demonstrate higher warmth behaviors. 
Further, it is posited that those high in SDO will be more impressed by competence behaviors 
when they are also paired with low warmth, and that those are low on SDO will be more 
impressed by warmth behaviors in the absence of competence-signaling behaviors.   
H3a: The relationship between SDO and performance evaluations is moderated by 
candidate competence, such that the relationship between SDO and performance 
evaluations is positive when competence is high and negative when competence is low.    
H3b: The relationship between SDO and performance evaluations is moderated by 
candidate warmth, such that the relationship between SDO and performance evaluations 
is positive when candidate warmth is low and negative when candidate warmth is high.   
Method  
 
Participants were randomly presented with appraisals for four employees at a given firm, 
using performance appraisals adopted from work used in prior research (Leslie, Manchester, 
Park & Mehng, 2012). Performance ratings were given for each of six dimensions, on a scale of 
1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). While three of these dimensions were related to competence (e.g., 
“secures relevant information and identifies possible causes of problems”), three signaled 
employee warmth behaviors (e.g. “demonstrates the ability and willingness to express opposing 
viewpoints with tact and consideration”). A small group of subject matter experts (10 faculty and 
graduate students) confirmed that the items were accurate reflections of these dimensions. The 
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high competence employee was shown to have very high competence ratings (M=4.7), and 
below the scale midpoint on warmth (M=2.3). The high warmth employee had scales that are just 
the opposite, excelling at warmth (M=4.7), but with low competence ratings. A third employee 
had both high competence and high warmth ratings (M=4.7).  Finally, a fourth employee had 
both low competence and low warmth ratings (M=2.3). After reviewing the information, 
participants were asked to evaluate the status of these employees according to five items (high-
status, respected, admired by others, high prestige, regarded highly by others) along a seven-
point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). 
Finally, a manipulation check was used where participants were asked to rate the employees 
according to four measures of competence (competent, capable, intelligent, and ambitious) and 
warmth (interpersonally warm, good-natured, sincere, trustworthy). After completing this survey, 
subjects completed a revised version of the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994) scale, which asks them to rate the extent to which they are 
high on hierarchy attenuating or hierarchy enhancing beliefs, (e.g., “In an ideal world, all people 
would be equal,” “It is sometimes necessary to step on others to get ahead in life.” 
Results  
 
 The same manipulation check included in Part II was also used in Part III to assess 
whether employees were perceived differently based on warmth and competence conditions. The 
manipulation check was analyzed by conducting a t-test to compare means across groups. After 
each condition (warmth/competence) was dummy coded (0,1), the results of the manipulation 
check indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between high and low warmth 
conditions as well as a high and low competence conditions, demonstrating that the manipulation 
used in this experiment was effective. In the case of comparing across warmth conditions, the 
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assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality 
of variances (p = .00). The mean warmth rating for those assigned to low warmth conditions (m 
= 4.58, sd = 1.69) was -.6 lower (95% CI, -1.08 to -.13) than those assigned to high warmth 
conditions (m = 5.18, sd = .89). There was a statistically significant difference in mean ratings 
between conditions t(129) = -2.49, p = .003. Similarly, in the case of competence conditions, the 
assumption of homogeneity of variances test as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of 
variances was violated (p = .00). The mean competence rating for those assigned to a low 
competence condition (m = 4.43, sd = 1.69) was -.26 (95% CI, -.59 to .085) lower than those 
assigned to a high competence condition (m = 5.69, sd = .77) a statistically significant difference 
t(129) = -6.57, p = .00. This demonstrates that the manipulation check was effective.  
 The data was first organized by aggregating performance evaluations across all categories 
into one outcome variable. Next, all participants were given a dummy code variable based on 
whether they were assigned to high (1) or low (0) conditions in competence and warmth. A 
hierarchical multiple regression was performed to test the hypotheses that warmth and 
competence moderate the relationship between SDO and performance evaluations, or more 
specifically, that SDO has a positive relationship with performance evaluations when 
competence is high and a negative relationship with performance evaluations when warmth is 
high. First, competence was analyzed as a moderator. In the first step, two variables were 
included: competence and SDO. The overall model accounted for a significant amount of 
variance F 2,130 = 4.69, p = .01. However, while competence was a significant predictor of 
performance evaluations (b = .7, p = .00, 95% CI .24 to 1.17), SDO was not (b = .07, p = .45, 
ns). In the second step of the model, the interaction term was added and each of the predictors 
were non-significant, including competence (b = .81, p = .19, ns), SDO (b = .09, p = .50, ns) and 
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the product term (b = -.04, p = .84, ns).  This model did not show a significant improvement in 
variance explained ΔR2 = .00, p = .84, ns.  
Next, the moderating effect of warmth was tested by entering warmth and SDO into the first 
step of a multiple regression model. The overall model accounted for a significant amount of 
variance F 2,130 = 5.95, p = .00. More specifically, warmth was a significant predictor of 
performance evaluations (b = .79, p = .00, 95% CI .35 to 1.25), whereas SDO was not (b = .05, p 
= .60, ns). In the second step of the model, the interaction term was added and the overall model 
did not improve ΔR2 = .00, F3,129 = 4.03, p = .61, ns. In this model, none of the predictors were 
significant, including warmth (b = .39, p = .09, ns), SDO (b = .09, p = .47, ns) or the interaction 
term (b = -.01, p = .61, ns). This model did not demonstrate a significant improvement in 
variance explained, and rules out the potential for a moderation effect ΔR2 = .00, p = .61, ns.2 
Part II & III: Limitations & Discussion 
 
There were many potential limitations to this study that might explain why these experiments 
yielded null results. Whereas the instruments used in this study were adapted from prior research, 
the results of the manipulation check, there were certain cases where the manipulation proved 
ineffective. Still, even in cases where the manipulation check was successful, SDO was not 
observed to be a significant predictor of status or performance evaluations. It may be that SDO, 
as a predictor, is not as related to objective evaluations as it is to socially relative evaluations. 
For example, while SDO has been used as a measure to capture general beliefs about inequality, 
it originated as a measure that reflected attitudes towards specific ingroups and outgroups. In this 
way, it is possible that SDO is relevant to ratings and evaluations only insofar as individuals can 
                                                 
2 The ANOVA for this regression equation including the interaction term reported significance 
(p = .01). This is likely due to multicollinearity (VIF range 7-8). 
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detect social information that can aid them in identifying whether the target is at the “bottom” or 
“top” of the pyramid within the greater context of societal inequality. It would be instructive for 
future studies to include more information about social characteristics in addition to competence 
and warmth signals, for example, socioeconomic status, race, and/or gender. It would be 
interesting if ideological differences only come to light once people are able to detect where 
social actors stand within a greater system of social inequality. Moreover, future research should 
take further steps to examine how this evaluation process is similar or different from self-
evaluations and social comparisons. 
Another point of consideration is that the construct of interest here refers to a globalized 
operationalization of status, whereas future studies might benefit from a more specific 
investigation of individualized social evaluations. That is, in this study, participants were asked 
to rate candidates in terms of perceived respect and esteem held by others towards that person. 
However, if we were to ask participants how much respect they personally have for a given 
candidate, we might observe a different response. The improved understanding of the awareness 
and mechanisms that lead to personalized beliefs diverging from global beliefs could serve as a 
fruitful area for future research. 
Despite certain null findings, this did yield a significant outcome - ideology does 
influence the extent to which people make statements about how people should demonstrate 
competence-signaling behaviors vs. warmth signaling behaviors to gain status. This is an 
important discovery because it demonstrates that people believe that they should act differently 
even when seeking the same social reward: status and respect. While researchers have used the 
social dominance orientation framework to understand social attitudes and beliefs, this work 
unpacks the more granular effects of ideology. If ideological values influence the way that 
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people weigh the importance of behaviors related to warmth and competence, these findings 
have implications for why people in the workplace may have diverging views regarding who 
should be hired to work for a company, who should be promoted into a leadership role, and 
which employees are demonstrating valuable performance.  
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Table 1 
 
Essay 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations among Focal Variables  
Variables Mean SD r 1 2 3 4 5 
Part I         
1. Social Dominance Orientation 2.98 1.23 .80 --     
2. Warmth Behaviors 3.69 0.80 .84 -0.29** --    
3. Competence Behaviors 3.44 0.77 .67 0.20 0.39    
 
Part II 
        
1. High competence rating 4.46 1.49 .96 -0.01     
2. High warmth rating 5.27 1.14 .86 -0.13     
3. High comp/warmth rating 5.27 1.15 .94  0.21     
4. Low comp/warmth rating 4.80 1.71 .97 -0.04     
 
Part III 
        
1. High competence performance 5.10 1.16 .88 0.03     
2. High warmth performance 5.00 0.82 .91 -0.09     
3. High comp/warm performance 5.52 1.23 .95 0.09     
4. Low comp/warm performance 4.02 1.75 .98 0.12     
Notes. N = 133.  
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
  
   
 72 
ESSAY THREE: COMPETITION OR COLLABORATION?  
THE SITUATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF STATUS BASED INTERACTIONS 
 
 Does the personal belief that one possesses a high-ranking status position obstruct or 
promote collaboration with others? More specifically, is it possible for multiple people with self-
perceived high status to work together effectively, or is there only enough room for one person at 
the top? This question has both practical and theoretical importance, since there are many 
settings where multiple actors who have achieved high status in disparate arenas are expected to 
come together to solve complex problems. I posit that status distinctions and the interaction 
patterns that follow are situationally activated. Situational factors guide actor’s motives and 
behaviors in two important ways: 1) by heightening or reducing feelings of interpersonal threat, 
and 1) by encouraging actors to focus on personal or shared goals. For the purpose of this 
research, I focus on situations with collaborative or competitive potential, and highlight the ways 
that status beliefs may help or hinder the achievement of personal and shared performance gains.  
 Status is defined as the level of respect, esteem, and prominence held by a person in the 
eyes of others. While others confer status, people are engaged in a constant process of 
interpreting and acting out their self-perceived status position. Whether status is assigned 
through formal organizational titles, or informal prestige, those who possess high status enjoy a 
number of privileges by virtue of their social standing. More recently, researchers have begun to 
focus on the possibilities and consequences of status-motivated interactions, with close attention 
paid to cases when more than one person sees themselves at the top of the social hierarchy 
(Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, Gardner, 2012; Bendersky & Hays, 2012).  
 This topic has important implications for management, since bidding wars over high 
status actors is common practice across a broad range of organizations, including sports teams, 
academic departments, consulting firms, start-up firms, and boards of directors. Indeed, the goal 
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of strategic human resource management often involves the recruitment of high-status 
individuals with the hopes of assembling a high performance team. However, there are subtleties 
to the interpretation of status that may sometimes allow individuals to leverage one another’s 
high standing or, at other times, get in each others’ way. Further, according to the conflict 
literature, status conflict is the must detrimental form of conflict, yet, we know less about the 
conditions or situational factors that cause such conflicts to arise in the first place (Bendersky & 
Hays, 2012).   
 While extant research in this area has provided valuable insights to our understanding of 
how perceptions lead to patterned behaviors, it has also been overwhelmingly focused on the 
negative shared outcomes of several actors’ self-perceived high status, while discounting the 
possibility of positive effects. For example, those involved in perceptual status disagreements 
have been shown to reduce their information sharing or withdraw their contributions, which, in 
turn, interrupts group processing and hurts performance (Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, 2016; 
Bendersky & Hays, 2012). Status may also hinder shared functionality by becoming the topic of 
conflict, as demonstrated when competition over status distracts from task achievement (Hildreth 
& Angus, 2016). In another case, too many high status actors may eventually result in 
performance loss, especially when individuals’ areas of expertise are shown to overlap 
(Groysberg, 2011). Moreover, status conflicts are highly detrimental, as evinced by research that 
demonstrates a stronger relationship between status conflict and reduced performance than all 
other types - including task, process, or relationship based conflict (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). 
 The goal of this research is to explore how self-perceptions of high status influence 
individuals’ ability to work with others.  I posit that although perceptual conflict between two 
actors who see themselves as high status is typically expected to lead to negative outcomes 
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(Bendersky & Hays, 2012; Gardner, 2010; Kilduff, Willer, & Anderson, 2016), there is also the 
potential for positive opportunities. That is, collaborative situations that prompt individuals to 
focus on shared outcomes may weaken the negative link between high self-rated status and 
performance, or in some cases, even reverse the direction of this relationship. When actors are 
encouraged to focus on shared goals, the ambiguity that allows for perceptions of competition 
and feelings of threat should be dispelled. This should lead actors to focus on their status position 
as an opportunity to support others rather than a means to bolster their own self-interest. Further, 
since the experience of high status is associated with a proactive orientation (Bunderson et al., 
2011), dyads that both feel they have high status are in a unique position to discover and leverage 
one another’s strengths. Ultimately, it is expected that high status actors will demonstrate an 
increased ability to work with others in order to enhance communication and clarify task-related 
goals for more effective collaboration. 
 I posit that prior research has relied on two central assumptions, both of which are open 
to challenge. First, while previous studies assume that beliefs about high status lead to self-
serving outcomes, I argue that the way in which people act out their status is guided by whether 
they are motivated by a personal or social frame. This notion is supported by recent theory that 
makes a distinction between bases of hierarchy, highlighting the difference between independent 
and interdependent positions of power and status (Blader, Shirako & Chen, 2016). Second, prior 
studies have focused on the relative nature of hierarchal status, emphasizing the “zero-sum” 
nature of status orderings, wherein only one person can be on top. This thinking prompts high 
status actors to be especially attentive to perceived threats to their position. While the relative 
nature of status is a methodological truth, I argue that subjective experiences of high status do 
not always subscribe to this schema. Indeed, a substantial body of research posits that “win-lose” 
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mental frames constitute a perceptual bias in situations characterized by a surplus of unrealized 
gains (Nadler, Thompson & Jount, 2000; De dreu et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2016). I will expand this 
line of research to consider cases where self-perceived high status actors might come together in 
order to maximize shared value.  
 Power and status are closely related concepts, with important distinctions. Whereas 
power refers to social influence and control (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Blader, Shirako & Chen, 
2016), status reflects one’s level of worth, value, and competencies as conferred by others 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Within the related stream of power research, the question of 
whether power increases or decreases pro-social motives and behaviors has produced mixed 
results (Galinsky, et al., 2006; Lammers et al., 2008). Researchers have explained this 
divergence by delineating between two distinct forms of power: personal and social. Whereas 
personal power refers to autonomy and freedom from the others, social power refers to control 
and influence over others (e.g., Weber, 1978). If personal power is based on independence, those 
who experience this form of power are free from the opinions and actions of others, which 
prompts them to attend to their social environment less. Tost (2015) makes a distinction between 
structural power and psychological power, arguing that structural power (e.g., role-based) is 
more likely to create a sense of responsibility, which causes actors to be more responsive and 
attentive to the needs of others.  
 This line of reasoning is very similar to more recent work on status. Rather than parsing 
out a separate form of power, some researchers have suggested that mixed findings in the power 
research are due to the conflation of power with status (Blader, Shirako, Chen, 2016). This 
perspective argues that since status is by definition conferred by others, those with high status 
become more closely attuned to the needs of those around them. Indeed, the differential effects 
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of status and power have been empirically tested, suggesting that those with high status tend to 
exhibit higher levels of fairness and justice in their interactions with others, whereas high levels 
of power have the opposite effect (Blader & Chen, 2012).  
 Together, recent directions in power and status research demonstrate that these concepts 
are much more complex than previously assumed. Further, while studies are beginning to 
uncover how self-perceived high status actors interact with low status actors, in benevolent 
versus self-serving ways, few studies have focused specifically on the interaction between two 
individuals who both see themselves as high status. I argue that a consideration of situational 
characteristics will allow us to unravel between critical differences in status-motivated 
interactions.   
High/High Status Dyads in Competitive Situations: Personal and Shared Value 
  
 So how do we explain past findings that “too many cooks in the kitchen,” or people who 
see themselves as high status, may be a recipe for disaster (Groysberg et al., 2011; Kilduff et al., 
2016)? I argue that unique features characterize these situations: the perception of threat and a 
focus on personal goals. According to the functional view of status, status orderings help 
facilitate the group achievement by assigning status to actors who are deemed the most 
competent, and directing the flow of communication (Berger, 1972). Deferential behaviors are 
traditionally viewed as status signals. These include both verbal and non-verbal micro-
interactions such as attentive facial expressions, nodding, smiling, praising, or soliciting advice. 
From this perspective, deference flows from low status to high status team members (e.g., Berger 
et al., 1972) in a process that symbolizes an asymmetrical subordinate-dominant relationship. 
The functionality of this social arrangement is supported by dominance complementary theory, 
which suggests that high status, dominant actors prefer interaction partners that respond to them 
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with conciliatory behavior (Tiedens, Unzueta & Young, 2007).   
 However, in cases where self-perceived high status actors are working together, it is more 
likely that their expectations for how they should be treated will go unmet, or even violated. That 
is, two people who both view themselves as high status may find that their interaction partners 
withhold acts of deference, failing to treat them in the way they feel they deserve. Thus, 
individuals likely experience feelings of threat once they realize that their self-perceived high 
status is unrecognized by others. Moreover, this experience is exacerbated by the fact that once 
they see themselves as high status, actors become highly attuned to status cues (Blader & Chen, 
2011) and develop a heightened sensitivity to threat. Indeed, studies have found that high status 
actors tend to be highly reactive and defensive to social evaluations (Gruenewald et al., 2006). 
Such findings reflect the inclination for high status actors to become overly concerned with 
maintaining their social standing. This focus leads to physiological symptoms, such as increased 
stress as measured by elevated cortisol levels (Helhammer, Buchtal, Gutberlet and Kirschbaum, 
1997), and ultimately, reduced performance (Marr & Thau, 2014).  
 While we cannot be certain about the exact mechanisms that lead high status actors to 
engage in counterproductive behaviors, I suggest that situational characteristics play a large role 
in determining how individuals will interact with one another. For example, in one past study, 
high status actors were studied within the highly competitive field of Wall Street equity 
(Groysberg et al., 2011). In another study, while the setting was not clearly competitive, self-
perceived high status participants had the choice to opt-out from group-related activities, as 
suggesting by their withdrawal of contributions (Kilduff et al., 2016). Further, the method of 
self-ranking builds on fixed pie perceptions, as when self-perceived high status actors are asked 
to rate themselves relative to others. I argue that situational factors may encourage both 
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competition and fixed pie perceptions. For actors who perceive themselves as high status, such 
an environment may be perceived as threatening, and will lead to suboptimal processes. As 
discussed, retaliation may take a subtle form of withdrawal, or it may take a more overt form of 
active conflict over status positions. It is expected that in a situation that cannot be immediately 
escaped, we will observe higher levels of overt conflict between two high status actors.  In both 
cases, self-perceived high status actors will demonstrate high levels of self-focus due to concern 
about maintaining their standing. It follows that a focus on personal goals (maintaining one’s 
status position) will take precedent over task-based processes and shared performance gains. 
This may cause actors to be overly suspicious about their interaction partner’s intentions, and 
overlook the potential for mutual benefits. If both partners have this mentality, they will be 
ineffective at producing value.  
H1a: In a competitive situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher personal 
gains than a low/low status dyad.  
H1b: In a competitive situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains 
than a low/low status dyad.  
H1c: In a competitive situation, a high/low status dyad will achieve higher personal 
gains than a high/high status dyad.  
H1d: In a competitive situation, a high/low status dyad will achieve higher joint gains 
than a high/high status dyad.  
High/High Status Dyads in Collaborative Situations: Personal and Shared Value 
 
 While comparatively less explored, there is reason to believe that when individuals both 
perceive themselves to have high status, there is potential for positive outcomes. Indeed, a 
relatively smaller body of research suggests that those who see themselves as high status might 
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adopt a pro-social orientation, given certain individual traits or situational characteristics. For 
example, individuals who are high on self-monitoring successfully gain status by demonstrating 
helpful behaviors (Flynn, et al., 2006). Other researchers have found that when helping behaviors 
are rewarded with deference from others, actors are more likely to increase their group 
contributions (Willer, 2009).  
Further, more recent work challenges the assumption that acts of deference are always 
reflections of the status ordering. Contrary to the dominance complementarity view, which 
suggests that asymmetric relations are the preferred mode of exchange (Tiedens, 2005), this 
work demonstrates that acts of deference are not only limited to beliefs and implications 
regarding someone’s superior standing, but also may be motivated by less strategic social 
affinities such as warmth, liking, or friendship (Joshi & Knight, 2015). For instance, two team 
members working closely together on a strategic proposal for the company might defer to each 
other because they share the same interests or objectives with respect to the firm’s strategic 
direction, feel a mutual affinity due to similar rank, or because they simply prefer to not 
challenge each other’s status on the team (Joshi & Knight, 2015; Fragale et al., 2012; Kalkhoff & 
Barnum, 2000). In this way, acts of deference are not always enactments of relative status, they 
may also be used as signs of warmth intended to communicate that someone intends to work with 
another person rather than against them.  
 Based on this discussion, I suggest that acts of deference are not always limited to those 
who perceive themselves to be low status. In fact, actors who believe themselves to hold high 
status might defer to others in order to encourage them to share useful information, motivate 
them to be persistent with a difficult task, or acknowledge their performance. This should take 
the form of positive reinforcement, which adds to a productive dynamic and buffers the potential 
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for feelings of threat. Moreover, these strategies tend to be highly effective. That is, high status 
individuals are especially influential when they choose to adopt an interest in collective gains 
(Bunderson, 2011). Whereas members of equal-status groups are less inclined to share uniquely 
held information (Stasser, 1999), in groups of unequal status, higher status members who 
demonstrate a participative style of leadership encourage information sharing ask lower status 
others for their unique input and give credit to their contributions (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & 
Franz, 1998). Further, the same study found that when high status members do not display a 
participative leadership style, the unique information held by lower status members was likely to 
be overlooked or ignored.  
 I argue that in collaborative situations, when self-perceived high status individuals are 
primed to focus on creating shared value, we will observe elevated performance. That is, two 
high status actors working together should be more effective than any other combination of 
status orderings in collaborative situations. This is because high status actors should be more 
engaged and motivated than low status actors to accomplish shared goals.  
H2a: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains 
than in a competitive situation. 
H2b: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher personal 
gains than a low/low status dyad.  
H2c: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains 
than a low/low status dyad.  
Hd2: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher personal 
gains than a high/low status dyad.  
H2e: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains 
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than a high/low status dyad.  
Low/Low Status Dyads in Competitive Situations: Personal and Shared Value 
 
 In contrast to those with high status, low status actors have relatively lower levels of self-
esteem, which influences their likely behaviors. Actors who perceive themselves as low status 
are expected to demonstrate more propitiating behaviors which prevent them from speaking up 
or out of turn, challenging others’ opinions, or sharing novel ideas (Bunderson, 2011). Empirical 
evidence tends to support these predictions, showing that low-status parties have low levels of 
psychological engagement, since their relatively low-status position is likely to undermine their 
sense of self and their belief that they have the efficacy to elevate their status (Joshi & Fast, 
2013; Marr & Thau, 2014; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). Indeed, low status carries negative 
implications that may prompt rationalization of one’s low status position (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & 
Nosek, 2004) or create psychological disengagement from the group (Smith, Murphy, & Coats, 
1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Further, in a group of studies examining the causal effects of status 
(Anderson, Kraus et al., 2012), the authors found that when participants were asked to imagine 
interactions with a partner who had either a low or high level of respect, admiration, and 
influence in their social groups, those who were made to experience high status reported higher 
levels of subjective well being than those who were manipulated to feel low status. 
 In a competitive situation, it is expected that low status dyads will do very little in the 
way of yielding to one another’s interests and needs. Unlike high status dyads who should be 
more actively engaged in promoting their needs, low status dyads are expected to demonstrate 
more protective behaviors. That is, low status dyads will demonstrate more defensive behaviors, 
but, as compared high status dyads, they will avoid overt conflict. On the other hand, in the case 
of dyads that include at least one high status actor, those with high status should be able to 
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encourage their partner to share information and become engaged in the process of productive 
exchange.  
H3a: In a competitive situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower personal gains 
than a low/high status dyad.   
H3b: In a competitive situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower joint gains than 
a low/high status dyad.  
Low/Low Status Dyads in Collaborative Situations: Personal and Shared Value 
 
 In a collaborative situation, two low status actors may either display low levels of 
engagement, or, they may demonstrate inhibited behaviors. If both actors display low levels of 
confidence and assertion, it is expected that they will not reach optimal gains. For these reasons, 
it is expected that two low status actors will be comparatively less engaged with a task focused 
on creating value than those with high status. Further, in support of the functional theory of 
status, the absence of a high status actor will leave low status dyads with a lower comparative 
level of responsibility and initiative for high performance. 
H4a: In a collaborative situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower personal 
gains than a low/high status dyad.  
H4b: In a collaborative situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower joint gains 
than a high/low status dyad.  
Method 
 
Procedure. Hypotheses presented here were tested with a 3 (status: low/low vs. high/low 
vs. high/high) x 2 (situational prime: collaborative vs. competitive) experimental factor design. 
This study used a negotiation scenario that has been used in prior research (Dimotakis, Conlon & 
Illies, 2012; Conlon, Moon & Ng, 2002; DeRue et al., 2009). Participants in the classroom chose 
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partners to create dyads, and each dyad was tasked with settling seven issues. Each participant 
was given materials to review regarding the case, as well as information about the roles they will 
play, and supporting background information that can be used as points for the development of 
positions. After reading the materials, participants were questioned to see if they understood the 
issues of the case.   
Sample. Participants were recruited from classes at a large university in the Southeast. 
An a priori power analysis was conducted to estimate a target sample size using G*Power 
analysis. By specifying t-tests to compare the difference between two independent means, the 
analysis suggested that 156 participants would be required to capture a medium effect size of .4, 
with a desired statistical power level of .8 power and probability of .05. In total, 158 subjects 
participated in this study. After removing missing and incomplete data, the hypotheses were 
tested on a final sample size of 144 undergraduate business majors. As compensation for their 
participation, participants received 2 extra points towards their final course grade.  
Negotiation Scenario. This study used a mixed-motive negotiation scenario. While the 
scenario and roles across conditions were identical, the pay-off schedule for each of the seven 
issues was manipulated so that two of the seven issues (moving expenses and insurance) were 
distributive and four of the seven issues had integrative potential. That is, four issues allowed for 
potential trade-offs (integrative), whereas two issues were in direct opposition to one another 
(distributive).  One of the seven issues was compatible, meaning that both negotiation partners 
received the same number of points for each potential decision. 
Situational manipulation. The situational manipulations were embedded in participants’ 
role materials. In the competitive condition, participants were told that the two companies have 
been engaged in decades of hostile competition. Further, participants were told that their ability 
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to perform well and “win” the negotiation by securing more points than their partner, will 
determine whether or not they will be titled the new Chief Human Resources Officer of the 
merging company. In the collaborative condition, participants were told that it is important to 
maintain a friendly relationship with their partner and that their successful collaboration will set 
the tone for the future of the company.  
Status manipulation. The status manipulations were embedded in participants’ role 
materials. Participants were primed to believe that they are high or low status, and were also told 
whether their partner is high or low status. The manipulation used here is taken from prior 
manipulations of status (Blader & Chen, 2012) within negotiations.  
Participants in the high status condition with high status partners were informed: 
You and your negotiation partner are quite well known in the industry as high-status 
individuals. You are both two of the most respected people in the industry. People really hold 
you both in high regard, and you both have a great deal of esteem from others.  
Participants in the high status condition with low status partners were informed: 
You are quite well known in the industry as a high status individual. You are one of the 
most respected people in the industry. People really hold you in high regard, and you have a 
great deal of esteem from others. On the other hand, your partner is not well known in the 
industry. When making important decisions, they typically defer to others who are held in higher 
regard and gave greater industry-level prestige than they possess.  
Participants in the low status condition with high status partners were informed:  
You are not well known in the industry. When making important decisions, you typically 
defer to others who are held in higher regard and have greater industry-level prestige than you 
possess. On the other hand, your negotiation partner is quite well known in the industry as a 
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high status individual. They are one of the most respected people in the industry. People really 
hold them in high regard, and they have a great deal of esteem from others. 
Participants in the low status condition with a low status partner were informed: 
You and your negotiation partner are not well known in the industry. When making 
important decisions, you both typically defer to others who are held in higher regard and have 
greater industry-level prestige than you both possess.  
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked to answer two questions to verify the 
success of the experimental manipulations: “How much status did the character or role you were 
playing have?” The question will be answered on a scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (a great 
deal). An additional check for the status condition will be in the form of a question, “How 
important was it to you that your negotiation partner show respect for you during the 
negotiation?” (scale ranging from 1 [not at all] to 7 [very]). 
Following the negotiation exercise, personal value was measured according to the 
number of individual points participants are able to secure, and shared value will be measured 
according to the number of joint gains realized within dyads.  
Participants were also asked to complete the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI), which 
examines the extent to which partners have built a trusting relationship and would be open to 
working together in the future.  
Results & Analysis  
 
A manipulation check was included to assess the degree to which the high and low status 
prime created a significant difference in the extent to which participants felt as if they were high 
status and had higher (or lower) status than their counterpart. A t-test was conducted to compare 
means between groups, and demonstrated that the manipulation was effective in creating a 
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difference in perceptions of status, but ineffective in creating a difference in how much respect 
each participant expected to receive. A t-test showed that those in the high status condition 
reported a higher mean than those in the low status condition and there was a statistically 
significant difference between groups t(147) = 5.84, p = .05. For the respect item, there was a 
homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p =. 94), while 
those in the high status condition reported a higher mean (m = 3.46, sd = .91) than those in the 
low status condition (m = 3.41, sd = .93), there was not a statistically significant difference 
between groups t(147) = -.33, p = .74. Similarly, the situational prime was ineffective. There was 
a homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .90), and 
while those in the collaborative condition reported a greater concern (m = 3.65, sd = .59) for 
their counterpart than those in the competitive condition (m = 3.53, sd = .57), the difference 
between the two was not statistically significant t(139) = 1.3, p = .19.  
The analysis for this study occurred in two stages. First, an ANOVA was conducted to 
determine if the means between the groups was equal. Next, a series of between-groups analyses 
were performed to test each set of proposed hypotheses. The results of the ANOVA suggested 
significant main effects of status dyads as well as an interaction between status dyads and the 
situation. To identify where these effects were located, I conducted a series of t-tests to compare 
group means.  
The first set of predictions suggest that within a competitive situation, two high status 
partners will achieve higher personal and shared gains than two low status partners. The results 
of an independent samples t-tests showed that the mean individual performance of two high 
status dyads was higher (10,105) than two low status partners (9,659). That is, high status 
partners performed 445 (95% CI, -1,200 to 2,091) points higher than low status partners. There 
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was not a statistically significant difference between the two t(40) = .56, p = .57. Next, it was 
predicted that high status partners paired with other high status partners will achieve both lower 
individual and lower shared gains than when paired with low status partners. An independent 
samples t-test was run to determine if there were differences in performance between the two 
groups. For individual performance, there was a homogeneity of variances as assessed by 
Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .85). The mean individual performance score for high 
status persons paired with high status partners was lower (9,659) than that for high status persons 
paired with low status partners (10,259). High status persons’ performance when paired with 
high status partners was 599 (95% CI, -647.08 to 1,846.55) points lower than high status persons 
paired with low status partners. There was not a statistically significant difference in mean 
performance between these groups t(37) = .98, p = .85. For shared performance, the assumption 
of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances 
(p = .035). The mean shared performance for high status persons paired with high status partners 
was 749 points (95% CI, -171.45 to 1,669.84) lower than high status persons paired with low 
status partners. However, there was not a statistically significant difference in mean performance 
between groups t(37) = 1.65, p = .09.  
The suggestion that high status dyads perform better in collaborative than competitive 
situations was supported. The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed 
by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .00). The mean shared performance for high status 
persons paired with high status partners in collaborative situations was 3,296 points (95% CI, 
1,191.63 to 5,400.88) higher than in competitive situations. There was a statistically significant 
difference in mean performance scores between situations, t(41) = 3.1, p = .003. The following 
set of hypotheses compares performance gains within collaborative situations. It is predicted that 
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high status persons when paired with high status partners will achieve higher personal and shared 
gains than when paired with low status partners. As for individual performance in collaborative 
situations, high status persons with high status partners scored 738.78 points (95% CI, -2,694.42 
to 1,216.89) higher than high status persons with low status partners. However, this difference 
was not statistically significant t(43) = -.76, p = .98. For shared performance in collaborative 
situations, high status persons when matched with low status partners scored 2,078.01 points 
(95% CI, -5708.57 to 1552.41) lower than when matched with high status partners. There was 
not a statistically significant difference in mean performance between groups t(43) = -1.15, p = 
.063. 
The next set of hypotheses suggests that within competitive situations, low status persons 
with low status partners will perform worse than when paired with high status partners. As for 
individual performance, low status people when paired with low status partners achieved higher 
performance 10,105.00 than when paired high status partners 9,688.24, contrary to the stated 
hypotheses. Low status persons with low status partners performed 416.77 points higher than 
when paired with high status partners (95% CI, -1,298.46 to 2,131.99), but there was not a 
statistically significant difference in mean performance between groups t(35)= .49, p=.26. As for 
shared performance, low status persons with low status partners performed 59.8 points better 
than those with high status partners, however, this was not a statistically significant difference 
t(33)=-.23, p=.18.  
The final set of hypotheses suggests that low status persons paired with low status 
partners in a collaborative situation will perform lower than those paired with high status 
partners. While there was not a statistically significant between these groups, the results were in 
the predicted direction, with low status persons with low status partners reporting a lower 
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individual performance mean (8,952.94) than those with high status partners (10,290.00). 
Similarly, low status partnerships with two low status members performed worse as a pair 
(16,828.57) than low status and high status partnerships (20,445.45). As for individual 
performance, low status persons with low status partners secured -1337 less points than those 
with high status partners (95% CI, -3,337.82 to 663.70), but there was not a statistically 
significant difference in mean performance between groups t(25)=-1.38, p=.38. In terms of 
shared performance, low status persons when paired with low status partners scored -3616 points 
lower than those with high status partners (95% CI, -6417 to -816), with no statistically 
significant difference in mean performance between groups t(23)=-2.68, p=.55. 
Discussion 
 
Most of the results of this study did not reach statistical significance. However, apart 
from low status dyad comparisons, the relationships were in the predicted direction. That is, the 
relative performance of status pairings shifted based on situational cues. There were several 
limitations of this study that likely contributed to a lack of statistically significant results. From a 
methodological viewpoint, while the primes used in this study were adapted from prior research 
studies, the manipulation checks revealed that while the status primes were effective in creating 
differing perceptions of status, it was ineffective in creating differences in expectations for 
respect. Similarly, the situational primes were ineffective. It could be that this study did not 
include a strong enough prime to override the status orderings within the naturalistic setting. 
Another possibility is that the structure of the negotiation payoffs made it difficult for partners to 
collaborate versus compete when prompted to do so. While participants were instructed to keep 
their payoff schedules unknown to their negotiation partner, a distributive payoff structure, or 
scenario where greater performance for one partner equals weaker performance for their 
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counterpart, might prevent partners from effectively cooperating with one another even when 
presented with a collaborative prime. Future studies should develop specific strategies for 
potential trade-offs between partners of different dyadic combinations for dealing with specific 
issues.  
Further, the data for this experiment was collected from classrooms where selection 
biases and interaction effects likely played a role in the results. That is, the participants in this 
study were students who negotiated with those closest in physical proximity to them, which 
likely included friends or those with whom they have shared other formative experiences. 
However, this study design did not account for familiarity or the quality of relationships between 
negotiators. Similarly, while there is reason to believe that individual differences take on 
meaning as status characteristics, this study did not measure traits such as extroversion and 
dominance, for example. It would be interesting for future research to examine the potential 
influence of individual characteristics such as these on both the actor’s role-playing and the 
interaction partner’s perceptions of status assignments. In addition, future research could benefit 
from field studies that might leverage the naturalistic emergence of status orderings within work 
teams or organizations. 
Another possibility is that status becomes especially salient for high status actors’ 
performance when pitted with or against other high status actors. Similarly, while it was not 
explicitly hypothesized, the results of this study demonstrated that low status actors when paired 
with other low status actors performed better in competitive situations than collaborative 
situations. It could be the case that competitive situations create feelings of threat when actors 
perceive themselves as being the same in status. The examination of status similarity, in 
comparison to status distance, could be a fruitful area for future research. Indeed, while studies 
   
 91 
focusing on the influence of status have recently surged in the management literature, we know 
comparatively less about the experience of low status and related outcomes. 
Despite these null findings and study limitations, one key finding emerged that 
contributes to existing research. That is, two high status actors perform substantially better when 
reminded that a work setting is collaborative vs. competitive, with ensuing rewards for each 
situation. Past findings on status conflict among high-powered dyads (Hildreth & Angus, 2016), 
and self-perceived high status actors within teams (Kilduff et al., 2016) suggest that those who 
perceive themselves as high status are destined to bring each other down. By focusing on 
situational characteristics, this work presents an alternate view: status positions take on meaning 
according to the given context. It is expected that high status actors competing against one 
another will be focused on defending their respective positions. Thus, high status actors may be 
more content to win more resources than their competitive partner, even if there are fewer 
resources distributed overall. On the other hand, in collaborative situations, high status actors are 
more likely to view their role as one of social responsibility. Thus, they are expected to claim 
less for themselves and work harder to extract shared value. This perspective also adds valuable 
nuance to our understanding of why conflict emerges in the first place. If high status actors are 
especially engaged when placed in competitive scenarios, this provides a useful explanation for 
why status conflicts are more detrimental than other types of disagreements (Bendersky & Hays, 
2012). That is, when high status actors are preoccupied with maintaining their standing, they 
may inadvertently engage in self-sabotaging behaviors by becoming distracted from the task at 
hand. On the other hand, if high status actors are confident that their standing is not in jeopardy 
and reminded to focus on shared goals, we are likely to observe an enhanced level of 
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performance. These points help refine our understanding of dyadic conflict within organizational 
settings.  
It follows that high status actors should be able to create room for each other at the top, 
especially in the absence of threat and when they are prompted to anchor on shared goals. This 
research proposes that both conditions can be successfully met by situational circumstances. 
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Figure 1: Overview of Essay 1 
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Figure 2: Overview of Essay 2 
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Figure 3: Overview of Essay 3 
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Table 1 
Essay 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Study Variables  
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Status 1.46 0.50 --     
2. Situation 1.49 0.50 -.10 --    
3. Gender 1.43 0.50   .15 .39* --   
4. Race 2.03 1.02  .16* .04 -.05 --  
5. Individual performance 10,203.38 2,515.95 -.19* .12 .02 -.11 -- 
6. Shared performance 20,222.53 3,624.94 -.21* .40 -.13 -.07 .49* 
Note. N = 156. Individual and shared performance are measured in number of negotiation points.  
* p < .05 
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Table 2 
ANOVA: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects on Shared Performance 
Source df F Sig. 
Corrected Model 
Intercept 
Status 
Situation 
Status*Situation 
Error 
Total 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
140 
144 
 6.88 
4,712.29 
  6.99 
  0.81 
11.10 
.00 
.00 
.01 
.37 
.00 
R2= .128 (Adjusted R2 =.110) 
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Table 3 
Individual performance of status dyads in competitive situations 
 Means Levene’s 
test 
t df p Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
High-High 
vs. 
High-Low 
19,227.27 
 
9,659.09 
.008 2.13 
1.91 
54 .04 
.06 
314.44 -737.75 1,366.63 
         
High-Low 
Vs.  
Low-Low 
19,976.47 
 
19,916.67 
.184 -.23 33 .82 59.8 -1,877.2 477.13 
         
Low-Low 
vs.  
High-High 
19,916.67 
 
19,227.27 
.00 1.69 38 .10 689.39 -1200.13 1,456.15 
 
Table 4 
Individual performance of status dyads in collaborative situations 
 Means Levene’s 
test 
t df p Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
High-High 
vs. 
High-Low 
22,523.53 
 
20,445.45 
.01 -1.59 54 .12 -2,078.08 -4,372.07 215.92 
         
High-Low 
Vs.  
Low-Low 
10,581.82 
 
8,952.94 
.44* 3.35 34 .00 3,616.88 1,422.99 5,810.78 
         
Low-Low vs.  
High-High 
8,952.94 
 
11,320.59 
.13* 3.43 46 .00 5,694.96 2,350.95 9,038.97 
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Table 5 
Individual performance of status dyads in competitive situations 
 Means sd Levene’s 
test 
t df p Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
High-High 
vs. 
High-Low 
10,258.82 
 
9,659.09 
1,797.24 
 
1,984.14 
.85 .98 36 .33 599.73 -647.08 1,846.55 
          
High-Low 
Vs.  
Low-Low 
10,105.00 
 
10,258.82 
3,078.87 
 
1,797.24 
.27 -.18 35 .85 -153.82 -1,877.2 1,569.61 
          
Low-Low 
vs.  
High-High 
9,659.09 
 
10,105.00 
1,984.14 
 
3,078.87 
.29 .56 40 .57 445.90 -1200.13 2091.94 
 
Table 6 
Individual performance of status dyads in collaborative situations 
 Means sd Levene’s 
test 
t df p Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
Lower 
 
Upper 
High-High 
vs. 
High-Low 
11,320.59 
 
10,581.82 
2,831.89 
 
2,784.56 
.98 -.76 43 .45 -738.77 -2,694.42 1,216.88 
          
High-Low 
Vs.  
Low-Low 
10,581.82 
 
8,952.94 
2,831.89 
 
2,213.63 
.31 -1.7 26 .10 -1,628.88 -3,593.35 335.59 
          
Low-Low 
vs.  
High-High 
8,952.94 
 
11,320.59 
2,213.63 
 
11,320.59 
.20 -3.2 39 .00 -2,367.65 -3,820.57 -914.72 
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Diagram 1 
High status dyads’ performance across situations 
 
 
Diagram 2 
Status dyads’ performance in collaborative situations 
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Diagram 3 
Status dyads’ performance in competitive situations 
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Appendix A 
 
Essay 2 – Measurement Scales 
 
Social Dominance Orientation Scale 
(adapted from Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) 
 
1.      Some people are simply not the equals of others. 
2.      It is important that we treat others as equals. 
3.      Some people are just more worthy than others. 
4.      To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others. 
5.      Some people are more deserving than others. 
6.      If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems. 
7.      In an ideal world, all people would be equal. 
8.      Some people are just not as good as others. 
 
All items were measured on a very negative (1) to very positive (7) scale; items 2, 6-7 were 
reverse coded. 
 
Original Social Dominance Orientation Scale  
 (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) 
(not used in this study) 
 
1. Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others. 
2. Some people are just more worthy than others. 
3. This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people were. 
4. Some people are just more deserving than others. 
5. It is not a problem if some people have more a of a chance in life than others. 
6. Some people are just inferior to others. 
7. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others. 
8. Increased economic equality. 
9. Increased social equality. 
10. Equality. 
11. If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems in this country. 
12. In an ideal world, all nations would be equal.  
13. We should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible. 
14. It is important that we treat other countries as equals. 
 
All items are measured on a very negative (1) to very positive (7) scale. Items 8-14 are reverse-
coded. 
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Appendix B 
 
Competence/Warmth Behaviors Scale 
(adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002) 
 
1. Act as a mentor who supports the development of your colleagues.  
2. Contribute to the company culture by contributing to a positive environment. 
3. Focus on building relationships with your supervisor/co-workers.  
4. Volunteer to serve on committees for employee interest groups. 
5. Host or coordinate gatherings outside of work to foster relationships with co-workers. 
6. Display awards you have won for your task accomplishments on your desk. 
7. Work to solve a tough problem at work even though you were not expected to.  
8. Make sure you appear to be an independent worker that needs little help from others. 
9. Demonstrate your aptitude at taking the initiative and being a self-starter. 
10. Keep track of how the work you contribute to the company is quantifiable (e.g., added 
revenue or sales numbers).   
11. Make sure that you do a better job than everyone else. 
 
Items 1-5 are warmth behaviors, items 6-11 competence behaviors. 
 
 
 
Original Competence/Warmth Behaviors Scale 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) 
 
1. Volunteer outside your working hours to help your co-workers with their personal issues. 
2. Use your personal time to help a coworker outside of working hours. 
3. Congratulate the winner of ‘best office employee’ award. 
4. Stay late at an office party even when you think everyone is pretty shallow. 
5. Work late to be sure you did the best job possible on a work assignment. 
6. Display awards you have won for your task accomplishments on your desk so your 
supervisor will see them. 
7. Work to solve a tough problem at work even though you were not expected to. 
8. Make sure that you appear secure and able to answer questions in a coherent way when 
called upon by your boss.  
Items 1-4 are warmth behaviors, items 5-8 competence behaviors. 
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Appendix C 
 
Essay 2 – Cover Letters 
 
Condition 1: High Competence/Low Warmth 
 
To Whom It May Concern:  
 
I am writing because I am interested in applying for this job position. To assure you that I will 
perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself. As a leader, I 
pride myself in delivering superior work with minimal guidance or direction. My high level of 
expertise allows me to work independently and deliver results, by any means necessary. 
Performance is the key to business. I do not let other people slow me down and I am motivated 
to perform better than those around me.  
 
These qualities make me the perfect candidate for this position. I look forward to hearing from 
you in the future.  
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Condition 2: High Warmth/Low Competence 
 
To Whom It May Concern:  
 
I am writing because I am interested in applying for a job position. To assure you that I will 
perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself. 
 
As a leader, I focus on developing the skills and talents of others. I am passionate about bringing 
out the best in my colleagues and helping them perform to their fullest potential. I have learned 
that relationships are the key to business. My track record of success comes from inspiring trust, 
excitement, and enthusiasm in the people around me. 
 
These qualities make me the perfect candidate for your position. I look forward to hearing from 
you. 
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Condition 3: High Warmth/High Competence 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
I am writing because I am interested in applying for a job position.In order to assure you that 
I will perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself.  
 
As a leader, I pride myself in delivering superior work with minimal guidance or direction 
and I also excel at developing the skills and talents of others.  My high level of expertise 
allows me to work independently and deliver results, by any means necessary. I do not let 
other people slow me down and I am motivated to perform better than those around me. My 
track record of success comes from inspiring trust, excitement, and enthusiasm in the people 
around me. 
 
These qualities make me the perfect candidate for your position. I look forward to hearing 
from you. 
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Condition 4: Low Warmth/Low Competence 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
I am writing because I am interested in applying for a job position. In order to assure you that I 
will perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself. 
 
I am excited for the opportunity to get leadership training at your company. One day, I would 
like to gain the skills required to work independently. I think that eventually I might be able to 
gain experience and learn how to excel in these areas. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
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Appendix D 
Performance Evaluations 
 
Condition 1: High Competence/Low Warmth 
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Condition 2: High Warmth/Low Competence 
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Condition 3: High Competence/High Warmth
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Condition 4: Low Competence/Low Warmth 
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Appendix E: Essay 3 - Status Negotiations Materials 
 
NEGOTIATOR INSTRUCTIONS:  PINNACLE SERVICES INCORPORATED 
 
In this study, you will be role playing a negotiation against another person.  You will be playing 
the role of an executive at Pinnacle Services Incorporated.   Your company has recently agreed 
to a merger with Mountain Enterprises.  One of the important tasks that needs to be done in a 
corporate merger is to make a variety of human resource management and compensation 
decisions in order to make the salaries, bonuses, vacation packages, and other benefits that are 
offered by the two companies consistent.  This is the task you will be performing in this study.  
You will meet with an executive from Mountain to negotiate these issues.  You will be in the 
role of the executive from Pinnacle; the other negotiator will be in the role of the executive from 
Mountain.  
 
There are 7 issues of concern in this negotiation: 
 
Signing Bonus 
Vacation Time 
Starting Date For New College Graduates 
Moving Expense Coverage 
Insurance Coverage 
Salary 
Training Center Location 
 
Your goal is to reach a settlement with the Mountain negotiator on all seven issues that is in the 
best interests of the merged company.  But, as the agent for Pinnacle, THE MORE POINTS 
YOU EARN, THE BETTER. This is consistent with what you would expect when two 
companies combine into one company. You may determine what type of agreement is best for 
you by referring to the "PAYOFF SCHEDULE" on the next page. 
 
The 7 issues are listed separately.  Along the left-hand side under each issue are five different 
settlement points for each issue.  The number of points you will receive for each type of 
agreement are shown in the column to the right.  As a negotiator, you need to settle each issue, 
though you can do so at any of the five levels on each issue. Thus there is a huge number of 
possible agreements. 
 
You should note that each issue has a different degree of importance to you, as indicated by the 
number of points you could gain on each issue.  
 
DO NOT AT ANY TIME TELL THE OTHER PERSON HOW MANY POINTS YOU ARE 
GETTING.  ALSO, DO NOT LET THE OTHER NEGOTIATOR SEE YOUR POINT 
SCHEDULE.  THIS INFORMATION IS FOR YOU ONLY. 
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Please become very familiar with your PAYOFF schedule.  The highest number of total points 
you can obtain from this negotiation is 19,200 and the lowest number is zero.   
 
 
  Lowest  Highest    
Signing Bonus 0 1600 
Vacation Time 0 4000 
Starting Date For College Grads 0 2400 
Moving Expense Covered 0  800 
Insurance Covered 0 3200 
Salary 0 6000 
Training Center Location                     0 1200 
Total 0 19,200  
 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT LET THE MOUNTAIN NEGOTIATOR SEE YOUR PAYOFF SCHEDULE 
 
Your payoffs for each issue appear on the next two pages. 
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Pinnacle Payoff Schedule 
  
 Signing Bonus Points  
 10% 1600 
 8% 1200 
 6% 800 
 4% 400 
 2% 0 
 
 
 Vacation Time Points 
 25 days 4000 
 20 days 3000 
 15 days 2000 
 10 days 1000 
 5 days 0 
 
 
 Starting Date For College Graduates Points 
 June 1 2400 
 June 15 1800 
 July 1 1200 
 July 15  600 
 August 1 0 
 
 
 Moving Expense Coverage Points 
 100% 800 
 90% 600 
 80% 400 
 70% 200 
 60% 0 
 
 
 Insurance Coverage Points 
 Plan A 3200 
 Plan B 2400 
 Plan C 1600 
 Plan D 800 
 Plan E 0 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Pinnacle Payoff Schedule (Continued) 
 
 
 Salary Points 
 $50,000  6000 
 $48,000  4500 
 $46,000  3000 
 $44,000  1500 
 $42,000 0 
 
 Training Center Location Points 
 Boston 0 
 New York 300 
 Chicago 600 
 Los Angeles 900 
 San Francisco 1200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DO NOT LET THE MOUNTAIN NEGOTIATOR SEE YOUR PAYOFF SCHEDULE 
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PINNACLE NEGOTIATION POINTS: 
 
Below are some reasons Pinnacle has for why they prefer various settlements.  We offer these to 
help you determine arguments you may want to use in your discussions with Mountain for why 
you prefer the settlement positions that you do.  Feel free to bring up these arguments (or to 
ignore these arguments) in your discussions with Mountain.  Also, we encourage you to think of 
additional reasons why you prefer the outcomes that you do.  
 
 
SIGNING BONUS 
 
Pinnacle has historically given out signing bonuses as a way of “sweetening the pot” for new 
employees.  Signing bonuses are attractive because they provide needed up front money to new 
employees, but they do not add to long term costs because they are only paid to an employee 
once.  In contrast, Mountain does not even offer their employees signing bonuses (!), in spite of 
the fact that 80% of companies now offer new employees signing bonuses.  You are convinced 
that signing bonuses are a big recruiting asset and you would like to see the merged company 
institute them at a generous level (say, 10%). 
 
Reasons that you might use to persuade Mountain to offer large signing bonuses include the 
following: 
 
1. Other companies offer lucrative signing bonuses. 
2. They help new employees cover initial expenses. 
3.    Prior Pinnacle employees have received them, and new hires at Mountain who hear that 
former Pinnacle employees used to get signing bonuses might feel upset.  
 
 
VACATION TIME FOR NEW HIRES 
 
Pinnacle employees have always received generous amounts of vacation time (25 days, in other 
words, five weeks).  In fact, it will be difficult for former Pinnacle employees to accept 
reductions in their vacation time now that they work for the merged company.  Therefore, you 
would really like to see a change in policies to provide more vacation time for all employees.   
Some arguments you can make for keeping vacation time at high levels are: 
 
1. Employees will be able to perform better if offered sufficient time to rest. 
2. Employees really care about work/family life balance these days, and giving employees time 
off to spend time with their family will be perceived as a valuable reward by employees. 
3. Some other forward-thinking companies offer 25 days. 
4. Employees can use part of their vacation time to go through some training and development 
programs at local colleges and universities. 
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STARTING DATE FOR NEW COLLEGE GRADUATES 
 
Pinnacle has always started college students as soon a possible, usually with a June 1st starting 
date.  There are several reasons that you would like to see new graduates start on an early date: 
 
1. The summer months tend to be less busy.  This gives the new hires a chance to get used to 
work at a relatively less frantic pace.  Employees who are around in the summer also have 
more time to help new employees because they too are less busy. 
2. New hires can help cover the jobs performed by other employees as June begins the peak 
vacation period and they can cover these responsibilities.    
3. Many college students like starting early so they can begin paying off their loans; others have 
no desire to waste the first two months after graduation doing nothing. 
 
 
 
MOVING EXPENSE COVERAGE 
 
Pinnacle was always generous with moving expenses, covering 100% of the expenses.  You 
would like to see the merged company offer 100% coverage, as this is consistent with Pinnacle 
corporate philosophy of treating new employees as well as possible (you feel that the early days 
of an employee’s career with the company are a good predictor of whether they are happy with 
the company long term, so whatever you can do to make the early days go as smoothly as 
possible is good).   Some arguments you can make for 100% coverage: 
 
1. New hires have just graduated from college and will not be able to pay for moving expenses 
– they need 100% coverage. 
2. For many people it will be a long move and would be very expensive. 
3. Many other companies offer 100%. 
4. If bonuses are low AND we give only partial moving coverage, it is difficult for new hires to 
manage their expenses. 
5. Many new hires have just spent a fortune on their education and cannot afford another bill. 
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INSURANCE COVERAGE 
 
Plan E is the current coverage level Mountain employees have.  It covers basic health issues but 
does not cover the cost of prescriptions, dental, eye, or mental health visits.  Pinnacle’s health 
coverage was also with a plan much like Plan E.  However, you would like to see the new 
merged company provide as comprehensive a coverage plan as possible.  In fact, the more 
comprehensive, the better, as this might make former Pinnacle employees feel better about 
working in the new merged company.   
 
Benefits of the other plans beyond Plan E: 
Plan D:  Adds eye coverage 
Plan C:  Adds eye and dental coverage 
Plan B:  Adds eye, dental, and mental health coverage 
Plan A:   Adds eye, dental and mental health coverage, plus covers prescriptions with a $10  
 copay by the employee. 
 
 
SALARY 
 
Not surprisingly, an important issue to be determined is what the salary level of entry level 
employees will be.  At Pinnacle, the starting salaries were around $50,000 and you don’t see any 
reason why the merged company should reduce that level of compensation for new hires.  Higher 
salaries would allow employees to attend evening classes in advanced programs at local 
universities, further developing their skills. 
 
 
TRAINING CENTER LOCATION 
 
New Pinnacle employees (who are largely in the Western U.S.) begin by receiving two months 
of training in San Francisco.  New employees hired by Mountain receive some amount of 
training (you aren’t sure how much) at the Mountain company training center, located in New 
York. If Mountain’s training center becomes the training center for the merged company, it 
would be a burden on former Pinnacle employees and their families if they have to be trained so 
far away for two months.  It would be great if they could be trained in a closer location.  You are 
unsure what will happen to the Pinnacle training center (one rumor is that it will be put up for 
sale).  So, while not a critical issue (it only affects employees for a short time), you would be 
pleased if the training center for the merged company could be located out west. 
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Important information for the Pinnacle Representatives: 
 
 
Since your company is undergoing a merger, only one 
person can serve as Chief Human Resources Officer 
(CHRO). If you win this negotiation, you will be the 
newest CHRO. However, if you lose by scoring fewer 
points than your partner, they will win CHRO and you will 
report to them from now on.  
 
 
 
 
